Epstein Secrets

ndeed, it did not so much as mention Perlman. Those two distinctions are critical. In analyzing the issue of whether a party was entitled under the Cohen Plaintiffs demand that intervenors inform them whether they believe the rules of civil procedure apply to this case. Motion at 11 n.3. That questio

party to the litigation, which this case does not. Second, Mohawk was concerned with an interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen I. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), not with the Perlman exception to the final judgment rule; indeed, it did not so much as mention Perlman. Those t

ndeed, it did not so much as mention Perlman. Those two distinctions are critical. In analyzing the issue of whether a party was entitled under the Cohen Plaintiffs demand that intervenors inform them whether they believe the rules of civil procedure apply to this case. Motion at 11 n.3. That questio

party to the litigation, which this case does not. Second, Mohawk was concerned with an interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen I. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), not with the Perlman exception to the final judgment rule; indeed, it did not so much as mention Perlman. Those t

exercise jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal out- side the context of a grand jury proceeding. See, e.g., In re Fed. Grand Jury Proceedings (Cohen), 975 F.2d 1488, 1491-92 (11th Cir.1992); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 832 F.2d at 558; Fine, 641 F.2d at 201-02. Rut we have exercised jurisdi

Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. EFTA00209814 Page 10 749 F.3d 999, 24 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1270 (Cite as: 749 F.3d 999) lateral-order doctrine, Cohen I. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); a certification provided by statute, 28 U.S.C. 1292(b); a petition for a writ of ma