Epstein Secrets

end to materials beyond the knowledge of the individual prosecutors assigned to a case, it does not extend to the collective knowledge of the entire United States government or even to the entire government agency concerned."); see also Locascio, 6 F.3d at 949 (refusing to impute to AUSAs knowledge of reports

including "police officers and federal agents who submit to the direction of the prosecutor and participate in the investigation." United States v. Barcelo, 628 F. App'x 36, 38 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 298 (2d Cir. 2006)). In considering whether Rule 16 and Brady

end to materials beyond the knowledge of the individual prosecutors assigned to a case, it does not extend to the collective knowledge of the entire United States government or even to the entire government agency concerned."); see also Locascio, 6 F.3d at 949 (refusing to impute to AUSAs knowledge of reports

including "police officers and federal agents who submit to the direction of the prosecutor and participate in the investigation." United States v. Barcelo, 628 F. App'x 36, 38 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 298 (2d Cir. 2006)). In considering whether Rule 16 and Brady

end to materials beyond the knowledge of the individual prosecutors assigned to a case, it does not extend to the collective knowledge of the entire United States government or even to the entire government agency concerned."); see also Locascio, 6 F.3d at 949 (refusing to impute to AUSAs knowledge of reports

including "police officers and federal agents who submit to the direction of the prosecutor and participate in the investigation." United States v. Barcelo, 628 F. App'x 36, 38 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 298 (2d Cir. 2006)). In considering whether Rule 16 and Brady

end to materials beyond the knowledge of the individual prosecutors assigned to a case, it does not extend to the collective knowledge of the entire United States government or even to the entire government agency concerned."); see also Locascio, 6 F.3d at 949 (refusing to impute to AUSAs knowledge of reports

including "police officers and federal agents who submit to the direction of the prosecutor and participate in the investigation." United States v. Barcelo, 628 F. App'x 36, 38 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 298 (2d Cir. 2006)). In considering whether Rule 16 and Brady

end to materials beyond the knowledge of the individual prosecutors assigned to a case, it does not extend to the collective knowledge of the entire United States government or even to the entire government agency concerned."); see also Locascio, 6 F.3d at 949 (refusing to impute to AUSAs knowledge of reports

including "police officers and federal agents who submit to the direction of the prosecutor and participate in the investigation." United States v. Barcelo, 628 F. App'x 36, 38 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 298 (2d Cir. 2006)). In considering whether Rule 16 and Brady

56, (1996) passim United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 1998) 19, 25 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) 7 United States v. Barcelo, 628 F. App'x 36 (2d Cir. 2015) 19 United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862 (2002) 30, 33 United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974) 30,

tes v. Southland Corp., 760 F.2d 1366, 1372 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Ignorance of the law is no defense to a charge of purposeful and intentional action."); United States v. Rosenfield, 469 F.2d 598, 601 n.2 (3d Cir. 1972) ("As long as the inexcusable intent is present, it is not necessary that the defendant know that