Epstein Secrets

ense may make arguments attacking the credibility of victims, the Government is free to argue that these witnesses are, in fact, victims of a crime. Cl United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 807 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that prosecutors may also "respond to an argument that impugns its integrity or the integrity

y this form of testimony, as explained above. To the extent Raymond stands for such a broad proposition, it is contrary to the law of this Circuit. See United States v. Joseph, 542 F.3d 13, 21-22 (2d Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260, 276 n.14 (2d Cir.

provide detailed and corroborating accounts of the Defendant's alleged role in enticing minors to engage in sex acts."); see also United States v. Curley, 639 F.3d 50, 59 (2d Cir. 2011) (explaining in an interstate stalking case that evidence of earlier abuse that was "similar in nature and severity"

utweighed by its prejudicial effect; and (4) the trial court gave an appropriate limiting instruction to the jury if so requested by the defendant." United States v. Arroyo, 600 F. App'x II, 13 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order) (quoting United States v. Lanam, 369 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2004). are offered for im

n which apparently relied in reaching her conclusions. This Court should reject the government's untimely effort to save testimony from exclusion. See United States v. Lewis, 818 F. App'x 74, 79 (2d Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (affirming exclusion of defendant's proffered expert evidence "that did not adhere to th

No. 07 CR 556, 2009 WL 3617448 (N.D. III. Oct. 27, 2009) 20, 21 United States v. Cummings, 60 F. Supp. 3d 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 26 United States v. Curley, 639 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2011) 26 United States v. Curley, No. SI 08 Cr. 404 (SCR), 2009 WL 10688209 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 15, 2009) 26 United States v.

elf pointed out, the characteristics of the modus operandi must be "sufficiently idiosyncratic to permit a fair inference of a pattern's existence." United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 487 (2d Cir. 1984)); see also United States v. Walla, No. 14—CR- 213 (MICE), 2014 WL 3734522, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014

6 United States v. Cummings, 60 F. Supp. 3d 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) vacated on other grounds 858 F.3d 763 (2d Cir. 2017) 6, 7, 8, 9 United States v. Curley, 639 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2011) 5, 6, II, 13 United States v. Dolney, No. 04-CR-159 (NGG), 2005 WL 2129169 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. I, 2005) 10, 15 United S

ns the admissibility of evidence of prior or subsequent tad acts'—evidence of `crimes, wrongs, or acts' other than those charged in the indictment." United States v. Curley, 639 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)). "The rule prohibits the admission of such evidence if it `prove[s] the cha

States v. Benussi, 216 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), affd sub nom. United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003) 7 United States v. Curley, 639 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2011) 10 United States v. Greebel, No. 15-cr-637 (KAM), 2017 WL 3610570 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2017) 5 United States v. Hsia,

elf pointed out, the characteristics of the modus operandi must be "sufficiently idiosyncratic to permit a fair inference of a pattern's existence." United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 487 (2d Cir. 1984)); see also United States v. Walla, No. 14—CR- 213 (MICE), 2014 WL 3734522, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014

6 United States v. Cummings, 60 F. Supp. 3d 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) vacated on other grounds 858 F.3d 763 (2d Cir. 2017) 6, 7, 8, 9 United States v. Curley, 639 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2011) 5, 6, II, 13 United States v. Dolney, No. 04-CR-159 (NGG), 2005 WL 2129169 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. I, 2005) 10, 15 United S