Epstein Secrets

dure do not allow them to intervene as parties to a prosecution." In re Amy Unknown, F.3d 2011 WL 988882 at *2 (5th Cir. Mar. 22, 2011). See also United Stases' Aguirre-Gonzalez, 597 F.3d 46, *Fed. R. Crim. P. 60 was adopted on April 23, 2008 and made effective on December 1, 2008. While this was after most

3/21/2011 Page 1 of 42 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA Case No. 08-80736-Civ-Marra/Johnson JANE DOE #1 and JANE DOE #2 I. UNITED STATES I JANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2'S MOTION FOR FINDING OF VIOLATIONS OF THE CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT AND REQUEST FOR A HEARING ON APPROPRIATE REMEDI

he agreement secret. In particular, the agreement stated: "The parties anticipate that this agreement will not be made part of any public record. If the United States receives a Freedom of Information Act request or any compulsory process commanding the disclosure of the agreement, it will provide notice to Epstei

d the government. Movants rely on a decision from the Southern District of Texas for the notion that CVRA rights apply prior to any prosecution. In United States' BP Products North America, Inc., the district court reasoned that because § 3771(d)(3) provided for the assertion of CVRA rights "in the district c

on facts of this case; "defendant is not entitled to specific performance in this case because such action would violate the laws of this state"); Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); (where "the plea bargain seemed fair on its face when executed, it has become unenforceable due to cir

place nor suppkniont the filing and seivice of pkadings or whet papers a by local mks of :oat. Tins form. approwed by the Judicial Conference of 'he United Stales In Septanba 1974. is required for the use of the Clerk tX Civil cockei nett SEE INSTRUC TIOVS ON THE REVERSE OF THE FORM.' NOTICE: Attorneys MUST

n "ancillary criminal proceeding[]," DE 290 at 2, presumably not covered by a statute of limitations applicable to a "civil action commences against the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). Even more surprising to us was your Office's failure to discuss the second sentence in § 2401(a), which provides that the si

on facts of this case; "defendant is not entitled to specific performance in this case because such action would violate the laws of this stale"); Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); (where "the plea bargain seemed fair on us face when executed, it has become unenforceable due to circumstan

he agreement secret. In particular, the agreement stated: "The parties anticipate that this agreement will not be made part of any public record. If the United States receives a Freedom of Information Act request or any compulsory process commanding the disclosure of the agreement, it will provide notice to Epstei

overnment claims is troublesome, the Fifth Circuit cited to the district court opinion under review, which had quoted all the words in the statute. See United States' BP Products, 2008 WL 501321 at *7 (noting victims right to confer "in the case"), cited in In re Dean, 527 F.3d at 394. 28 EFTA00185036 One 2108

on facts of this case; "defendant is not entitled to specific performance in this case because such action would violate the laws of this state"); Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); (where "the plea bargain seemed fair on its face when executed, it has become unenforceable due to cir

58-59, 89-90). Petitioners leveraged the NPA to their advantage by arguing that it precluded Mr. Epstein from contesting liability. See Doe No. 1 v. United States, 749 F.3d 999, 1002 (11'h Cir. 2014) ("As a basis for relief against Epstein in the civil suit, the victims relied on Epstein's waiver of his right

y stems from the Constitution's delegation of "take Care" duties, U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, and the pardon power, id. § 2, to the Executive Branch. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 . . . (1996); In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d 255, 262-63 (D.C.Cir.2013). Decisions to initiate charges, or to dismiss

State v. Wall, 348 N.C. 671 (1998) (holding that court cannot enforce a plea agreement for concurrent sentence where law mandated consecutive one); Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (court cannot enforce an illegal sentence below the statutory range; remedy was for defendant to withdr

he agreement secret. In particular, the agreement stated: "The parties anticipate that this agreement will not be made part of any public record. If the United States receives a Freedom of Information Act request or any compulsory process commanding the disclosure of the agreement, it will provide notice to Epstei

on facts of this case; "defendant is not entitled to specific performance in this case because such action would violate the laws of this state"); Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); (where "the plea bargain seemed fair on its face when executed, it has become unenforceable due to cir

he agreement secret. In particular, the agreement stated: "The parties anticipate that this agreement will not be made part of any public record. If the United States receives a Freedom of Information Act request or any compulsory process commanding the disclosure of the agreement, it will provide notice to Epstei

on facts of this case; "defendant is not entitled to specific performance in this case because such action would violate the laws of this state"); Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); (where "the plea bargain seemed fair on its face when executed, it has become unenforceable due to cir