Epstein Secrets

"United States"); United States v. Bruno, 159 F. Supp. 3d 311, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ("The Court disagrees with Defendant's argument that the phrase `United States' shows an intent to bind all United States Attorney's Offices. Rather, the plea agreement covers only Defendant's liability in the SDFL."). As the S

Cir. Apr. 26, 2002) (summary order) (plea agreement does not bind other districts "even if the plea agreement purports to bind `the Government' or the "United States"); United States v. Bruno, 159 F. Supp. 3d 311, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ("The Court disagrees with Defendant's argument that the phrase `United States'

r v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) 56 Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2004) 47 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970) 48 United State v. Nader, 425 F. Supp. 3d 619 (E.D. Va. 2019) passim United States v. Ahmed, 992 F. Supp. 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 166 United States v. Ahmed, No.

35,36, 41, 42 Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) 56, 57 Madanes v. Madanes, 186 F.R.D. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 141 Martindell v. Intl Tel. and Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979) passim Martinez v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 150, 151 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974

"United States"); United States v. Bruno, 159 F. Supp. 3d 311, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ("The Court disagrees with Defendant's argument that the phrase `United States' shows an intent to bind all United States Attorney's Offices. Rather, the plea agreement covers only Defendant's liability in the SDFL."). As the S

Cir. Apr. 26, 2002) (summary order) (plea agreement does not bind other districts "even if the plea agreement purports to bind `the Government' or the "United States"); United States v. Bruno, 159 F. Supp. 3d 311, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ("The Court disagrees with Defendant's argument that the phrase `United States'

r v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) 56 Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2004) 47 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970) 48 United State v. Nader, 425 F. Supp. 3d 619 (E.D. Va. 2019) passim United States v. Ahmed, 992 F. Supp. 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 166 United States v. Ahmed, No.

35,36, 41, 42 Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) 56, 57 Madanes v. Madanes, 186 F.R.D. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 141 Martindell v. Intl Tel. and Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979) passim Martinez v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 150, 151 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974

Cir. Apr. 26, 2002) (summary order) (plea agreement does not bind other districts "even if the plea agreement purports to bind `the Government' or the "United States"); United States v. Bruno, 159 F. Supp. 3d 311, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ("The Court disagrees with Defendant's argument that the phrase `United States'

"United States"); United States v. Bruno, 159 F. Supp. 3d 311, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ("The Court disagrees with Defendant's argument that the phrase `United States' shows an intent to bind all United States Attorney's Offices. Rather, the plea agreement covers only Defendant's liability in the SDFL."). As the S

r v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) 40 Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2004) 35 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970) 35 United State v. Nader, 425 F. Supp. 3d 619 (E.D. Va. 2019) passim United States v. Alzmad, 992 F. Supp. 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 112 United States v. Ahmed, 10

cal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) 40 Lighte, 782 F.3d 120 Madanes v. Madanes, 186 F.R.D. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 98 Martindell v. Intl Tel. and Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979) 59, 63, 77, 102 Martindell, 594 F.3d 79 Martinez v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 104 Michigan

"United States"); United States v. Bruno, 159 F. Supp. 3d 311, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ("The Court disagrees with Defendant's argument that the phrase `United States' shows an intent to bind all United States Attorney's Offices. Rather, the plea agreement covers only Defendant's liability in the SDFL."). As the S

Cir. Apr. 26, 2002) (summary order) (plea agreement does not bind other districts "even if the plea agreement purports to bind `the Government' or the "United States"); United States v. Bruno, 159 F. Supp. 3d 311, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ("The Court disagrees with Defendant's argument that the phrase `United States'

r v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) 56 Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2004) 47 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970) 48 United State v. Nader, 425 F. Supp. 3d 619 (E.D. Va. 2019) passim United States v. Ahmed, 992 F. Supp. 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 166 United States v. Ahmed, No.

35,36,41,42 Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) 56, 57 Madanes v. Madanes, 186 F.R.D. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 141 Martindell v. Intl Tel. and Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979) passim Martinez v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 150, 151 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (197

t could have filed a writ of mandamus, since "mandamus lies to compel a judge to unseal documents shown to be material and necessary in litigation," United States v. Davis, 702 F.2d 418, 423 (2d Cir. 1983). But the Government has done neither of the above; instead, it has moved pursuant to the All Writs Act. I

odification on these grounds, I address this factor in light of the current proceedings before the Second Circuit. The term is not well understood. See United States v. Talco Contractors, Inc., 153 F.R.D. 501, 511 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (observing that the Circuit "provided no guidance as to what might constitute `impr

ew York v. Siemens Med Sys., Inc., 797 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[W]e continue to adhere to our holding in Martindell [v. International Tel. and Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 294 (2d Cir. 1979)), that 'this extraordinary writ [mandamus] would hardly be available . . . where the only purpose was to obtain mo

t could have filed a writ of mandamus, since "mandamus lies to compel a judge to unseal documents shown to be material and necessary in litigation," United States v. Davis, 702 F.2d 418, 423 (2d Cir. 1983). But the Government has done neither of the above; instead, it has moved pursuant to the All Writs Act. I

odification on these grounds, I address this factor in light of the current proceedings before the Second Circuit. The term is not well understood. See United States v. Talco Contractors, Inc., 153 F.R.D. 501, 511 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (observing that the Circuit "provided no guidance as to what might constitute `impr

ew York v. Siemens Med Sys., Inc., 797 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[W]e continue to adhere to our holding in Martindell [v. International Tel. and Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 294 (2d Cir. 1979)], that `this extraordinary writ [mandamus] would hardly be available ... where the only purpose was to obtain modi