Epstein Secrets

equired `only where the charges of the indictment are so general that they do not advise the defendant of the specific acts of which he is accused!" United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 47 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Torres, 901 F.2d at 234); see United States v. Mahabub, No. 13 Cr. 908 (MN), 2014 WL 4243657, at *

) material reasonably in advance of trial, and will engage in good faith discussions with the defense regardinga schedule for pretrial disclosures. See United States v. Sergentakis, No. 05 Cr. 230 (JFK), 2005 WL 1994014, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2005) ("18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) calls for production of Government wit

trials held in Brooklyn were drawn from the entire Eastern District, while jurors for trials held in the "Long Island Division," which included the Uniondale 200 EFTA00100167 courthouse, were drawn from Nassau and Suffolk Counties. Id. at 24. The defendant argued that the district court erred by selec

nvolve conduct that occurred in Brooklyn, appears to have been indicted in Brooklyn, was originally tried in Brooklyn, and was later transferred to Uniondale, where it was tried with a jury drawn from the "Long Island Division." Yet the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's claimed entitlement to a jury

equired 'only where the charges of the indictment are so general that they do not advise the defendant of the specific acts of which he is accused!" United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 47 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Torres, 901 F.2d at 234); see United States v. Mahabub, No. 13 Cr. 908 (AJN), 2014 WL 4243657, at

material reasonably in advance of trial, and will engage in good faith discussions with the defense regarding a schedule for pretrial disclosures. See United States v. Sergentakis, No. 05 Cr. 230 (JFK), 2005 WL 1994014, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2005) C' 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) calls for production of Government wi

trials held in Brooklyn were drawn from the entire Eastern District, while jurors for trials held in the "Long Island Division," which included the Uniondale 200 EFTA00077832 courthouse, were drawn from Nassau and Suffolk Counties. Id. at 24. The defendant argued that the district court erred by selec

nvolve conduct that occurred in Brooklyn, appears to have been indicted in Brooklyn, was originally tried in Brooklyn, and was later transferred to Uniondale, where it was tried with a jury drawn from the "Long Island Division." Yet the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's claimed entitlement to a jury

equired 'only where the charges of the indictment are so general that they do not advise the defendant of the specific acts of which he is accused!" United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 47 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Torres, 901 F.2d at 234); see United States v. Mahabub, No. 13 Cr. 908 (AJN), 2014 WL 4243657, at

material reasonably in advance of trial, and will engage in good faith discussions with the defense regarding a schedule for pretrial disclosures. See United States v. Sergentakis, No. 05 Cr. 230 (JFK), 2005 WL 1994014, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2005) C' 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) calls for production of Government wi

trials held in Brooklyn were drawn from the entire Eastern District, while jurors for trials held in the "Long Island Division," which included the Uniondale 200 EFTA00039647 courthouse, were drawn from Nassau and Suffolk Counties. Id. at 24. The defendant argued that the district court erred by selec

nvolve conduct that occurred in Brooklyn, appears to have been indicted in Brooklyn, was originally tried in Brooklyn, and was later transferred to Uniondale, where it was tried with a jury drawn from the "Long Island Division." Yet the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's claimed entitlement to a jury

r bill of particulars where discovery and indictment was "sufficient to apprise the defendant of the charge" and to allow him to prepare for trial); United States v. Trippe, 171 F. Supp. 2d 230, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (denying bill of particulars request in stock fraud case where indictment was fifteen pages long

material reasonably in advance of trial, and will engage in good faith discussions with the defense regarding a schedule for pretrial disclosures. See United States v. Sergentakis, 05 Cr. 230 (JFK), 2005 WL 1994014, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2005) ("18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) calls for production of Government witness

trials held in Brooklyn were drawn from the entire Eastern District, while jurors for trials held in the "Long Island Division," which included the Uniondale courthouse, were drawn from Nassau and Suffolk Counties. Id. at 24. The defendant argued that the district court erred by selecting the jury from t

that is likely to be the case, it is not necessarily so. Bahia again illustrates the point, as a case originally tried in Brooklyn was reassigned to Uniondale for the retrial "to accommodate trial congestion in the court's calendar during a period of judicial emergency . . . ." United States v. Soares, 66

equired `only where the charges of the indictment are so general that they do not advise the defendant of the specific acts of which he is accused.' United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 47 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Torres, 901 F.2d at 234); see United States v. Mahabub, No. 13 Cr. 908 (AJN), 2014 WL 4243657, at

material reasonably in advance of trial, and will engage in good faith discussions with the defense regarding a schedule for pretrial disclosures. See United States v. Sergentakis, No. 05 Cr. 230 (JFK), 2005 WL 1994014, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2005) ("18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) calls for production of Government wit

trials held in Brooklyn were drawn from the entire Eastern District, while jurors for trials held in the "Long Island Division," which included the Uniondale 200 EFTA00103225 courthouse, were drawn from Nassau and Suffolk Counties. Id. at 24. The defendant argued that the district court erred by selec

nvolve conduct that occurred in Brooklyn, appears to have been indicted in Brooklyn, was originally tried in Brooklyn, and was later transferred to Uniondale, where it was tried with a jury drawn from the "Long Island Division." Yet the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's claimed entitlement to a jury