Epstein Secrets

end to materials beyond the knowledge of the individual prosecutors assigned to a case, it does not extend to the collective knowledge of the entire United States government or even to the entire government agency concerned."); see also Locascio, 6 F.3d at 949 (refusing to impute to AUSAs knowledge of reports

ion of knowledge to the prosecutor . ." United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1993) (declining to "infer the prosecutors' knowledge simply because some other government agents knew about" additiona

end to materials beyond the knowledge of the individual prosecutors assigned to a case, it does not extend to the collective knowledge of the entire United States government or even to the entire government agency concerned."); see also Locascio, 6 F.3d at 949 (refusing to impute to AUSAs knowledge of reports

on of knowledge to the prosecutor . . ." United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1993) (declining to "infer the prosecutors' knowledge simply because some other government agents knew about" additiona

end to materials beyond the knowledge of the individual prosecutors assigned to a case, it does not extend to the collective knowledge of the entire United States government or even to the entire government agency concerned."); see also Locascio, 6 F.3d at 949 (refusing to impute to AUSAs knowledge of reports

on of knowledge to the prosecutor . . ." United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1993) (declining to "infer the prosecutors' knowledge simply because some other government agents knew about" additiona

end to materials beyond the knowledge of the individual prosecutors assigned to a case, it does not extend to the collective knowledge of the entire United States government or even to the entire government agency concerned."); see also Locascio, 6 F.3d at 949 (refusing to impute to AUSAs knowledge of reports

on of knowledge to the prosecutor . . ." United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1993) (declining to "infer the prosecutors' knowledge simply because some other government agents knew about" additiona

end to materials beyond the knowledge of the individual prosecutors assigned to a case, it does not extend to the collective knowledge of the entire United States government or even to the entire government agency concerned."); see also Locascio, 6 F.3d at 949 (refusing to impute to AUSAs knowledge of reports

on of knowledge to the prosecutor . . ." United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1993) (declining to "infer the prosecutors' knowledge simply because some other government agents knew about" additiona

tes v. Southland Corp., 760 F.2d 1366, 1372 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Ignorance of the law is no defense to a charge of purposeful and intentional action."); United States v. Rosenfield, 469 F.2d 598, 601 n.2 (3d Cir. 1972) ("As long as the inexcusable intent is present, it is not necessary that the defendant know that

rticipated in this investigation does not mean that the entire DOL is properly considered part of the prosecution team."); see also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 949 (2d Cir.1993) (refusing, for Brady purposes, to impute to AUSAs prosecuting that action with the assistance of certain FBI agents