Epstein Secrets

ests that the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida defer such prosecution"). Thus, the 8 EFTA00066001 NPA's references to the "United States" demonstrate a definitional intent not to limit such provisions to the USAO-SDFL. The NPA begins with several factual recitals. After noting certai

e government's position. The co-conspirator immunity provision does not prohibit merely prosecutions by the USAO for the SDFL ("USAO-SDFL"), but by "the United States." This broad prohibition was intentional, as demonstrated by the express references elsewhere in the NPA to the United States Attorney and/or the US

States v. Mozer, 828 F. Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 12 iii EFTA00065992 United States v. Papa, 533 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1975) 29 United States v. Persico, 620 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 774 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985) 22 United States v. Prisco, 391 F. App'x 920 (2d Cir. 2010) 22 United States v.

ests that the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida defer such prosecution"). Thus, the 8 EFTA00099364 NPA's references to the "United States" demonstrate I definitional intent not to limit such provisions to the USAO-SDFL. The NPA begins with several factual recitals. After noting certai

e government's position. The co-conspirator immunity provision does not prohibit merely prosecutions by the USAO for the SDFL ("USAO-SDFL"), but by "the United States." This broad prohibition was intentional, as demonstrated by the express references elsewhere in the NPA to the United States Attorney and/or the US

States v. Mozer, 828 F. Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 12 iii EFTA00099355 United States v. Papa, 533 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1975) 29 United States v. Persico, 620 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 774 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985) 22 United States v. Prisco, 391 F. App'x 920 (2d Cir. 2010) 22 United States v.

200 (2d Cir. 1995) United States v. Pelull°, 399 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2005) United States v. Perez, 940 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2011) 8 21 10 8 United States v. Reese, 933 F. Supp. 2d 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 13, 16 United States v. Rigas, 258 F. Supp.

tensive attack by reason of other evidence, the undisclosed evidence may properly be viewed as cumulative, and hence not material." United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85, 111 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing cases). With regard to the timing of disclosing material under Giglio, the Second Circuit, in Coppa, rejec

tes v. Southland Corp., 760 F.2d 1366, 1372 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Ignorance of the law is no defense to a charge of purposeful and intentional action."); United States v. Rosenfield, 469 F.2d 598, 601 n.2 (3d Cir. 1972) ("As long as the inexcusable intent is present, it is not necessary that the defendant know that