Epstein Secrets

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA Case No. 08-80736-Civ-Marra/Johnson JANE DOES #1 and #2 I. UNITED STATES JOINT STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS The parties hereby stipulate and agree that the following facts are not in dispute and may be accepted as true

ensued between the United States and Epstein. Despite the investigation revealing that Epstein had molested more than 40 minor girls, in Late 2007, the United Stales entered into a non- prosecution agreement (NPA) with Epstein - esseNiatly egree:ng to immunize Epstein for al of the Federal Sex crimes he committed

copy of the terms was not provided. A notification was not provided to Jane Doe #2 because the agreement limited Epstein's liability to victims whom the United States was prepared to name in an indictment. As a result, Jane Doe #2 never received a notification a letter about the agreement. The-rietifieation4id-net

on the [NPA] when seeking civil relief against Epstein . . . and affirmatively advanced the terms of the [NPA] as a basis for relief from Epstein." United States' Reply in Support of its Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Doc. 205-6 at 12-13. After reaping the benefits of the NPA, the

ty Co.. Excalibur Reinsurance Corp., No. 3:1 I-CV-1209 (CSH) (D. Conn. Aug. 5, 2013), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110400, at *37, quoting United States', Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1995). These principles are vitally important here where counsels' private communications with prosecutors "if publicl

in similarly abusive circumstances at the time of trial, and who gave dishonest answers regarding that subject at voir dire, was impliedly biased); United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (implying bias where, in a trial for participation in a heroin distribution conspiracy, a

ere and there is no legal basis for Juror No. 50 to intervene in this matter. This is not a request by a journalist to intervene for public access. See United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2008) (motion to intervene to assert the public's First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings is prop

or not to enter [a] protective order"). The fact that Juror No. 50 filed these pleadings does not make them "judicial documents." United States v. Amodeo ("Amodeo I'), 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995) ("We think that the mere filing of a paper or document with the court is insufficient to 54 EFTA0015

5-6 (denying a defendant's application for modification of a criminal protective order so he could use certain discovery materials in a FOIA suit); United States v. DeNunzio, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2020 WL 1495880, at *2-.3 (D. Mass. March 27, 2020) (denying a defendant's motion to modify two protective orders i

ptively accessible, can be kept from the public if their dissemination might 'adversely affect law enforcement interests.") (citing United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1050)); see also United States v. Park, 619 F. Supp. 2d 89, 94 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that the need to "maintain the secrecy of th

ial function and useful in the judicial process," thereby qualifying as a "judicial document" for purposes of the first element of the Lugosch test. United States v. Amodeo ("Amodeo 1"), 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995). Second, the Court assumes that the common law presumption of access attaches, thereby satis

seful in the judicial process," thereby qualifying as a "judicial document" for purposes of the first element of the Lugosch test. United States v. Amodeo ("Amodeo 1"), 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995). Second, the Court assumes that the common law presumption of access attaches, thereby satisfying the

motion misstated the right-to-access law. To the contrary the Opinion correctly summarized the law, and properly identified the leading cases from the United States Supreme Court and this Court. See, e.g., Sp.App. 16-26. The gravamen of the appellants' argument centered on—and many of the panel's questions were

nt third parties as well as those of defendants that may be harmed by disclosure . . . should weigh heavily in a court's balancing equation.. .."); Amodeo, 71 F.3d at 1050 ("We have previously held that the privacy interests of innocent third parties . . . should weigh heavily in a court's balancing e

n abuse of discretion occurs if the district court fails to make the required factual findings, or if those factual findings are clearly erroneous." United States v. Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d 68,71 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). B. The district court erred in ordering the unsealing. There are "two rela

f the persons whose intimate relations may thereby be 40 EFTA00075522 Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page47 of 74 disclosed."); Amodeo 11,71 F.3d at 1050 (" [T]he privacy interests of innocent third parties . . . should weigh heavily in a court's balancing equation."). This Court h

ial function and useful in the judicial process," thereby qualifying as a "judicial document" for purposes of the first element of the Lugosch test. United States v. Amodeo ("Amodeo I"), 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995). Second, the Court assumes that the common law presumption of access attaches, thereby satis

seful in the judicial process," thereby qualifying as a "judicial document" for purposes of the first element of the Lugosch test. United States v. Amodeo ("Amodeo I"), 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995). Second, the Court assumes that the common law presumption of access attaches, thereby satisfying the

dence, a "judicial document" is an item "relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process." United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995). A common law presumption of access attaches to any judicial document, and an additional First Amendment right ari

e no history of openness, the mere "logic" of public access is a sufficient basis for the First Amendment right. See, e.g., Suarez, 880 F.2d at 631; United States v. Index Newspapers LLC, 766 F.3d 1072, 1094 (9th Cir. 2014) ("logic alone, even without experience, may be enough to establish the [First Amendment]