Epstein Secrets

ts `[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Government activity qualifies as a search under the Fourth A

t has already extended Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

ts '[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Government activity qualifies as a search under the Fourth A

t has already extended Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

ts `[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Government activity qualifies as a search under the Fourth A

t has already extended Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

confidential information governed by the protective order to other government agencies for the purpose of enforcing the criminal or civil laws of the United States. Thus, the Government seeks to reserve the right to use confidential information produced by Fisher in this case in unrelated civil or criminal ma

ce of parties and witnesses and in interest of justice bears burden of estab- lishing by preponderance of evidence that transfer is necessary. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a). 6. Federal Courts 6=101, 103, 105 Although trial judge is afforded great discretion in deciding motion to transfer for convenience of

in venture. First ventur- er moved to dismiss or for summary judg- ment, and second venturer cross-moved for summary judgment. The District Court, Conboy, J., held that: (1) agreement under which first joint venturer agreed to return capital contribution to second joint venturer upon return of all i

ts `[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Government activity qualifies as a search under the Fourth A

t has already extended Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

ts `[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Government activity qualifies as a search under the Fourth A

t has already extended Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

name in an Indictment as victims of an offense by Mr. Epstein enumerated in 18 U.S.C. §2255. Request No. 2. All documents referring or relating to the United States' agreement with Defendant to defer federal prosecution subject to certain conditions, including without limitation, the operative agreement between

AM Document 63 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/25/2009 Page 9 of 37 Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein Page 9 can be used at trial. !g; Pillsbury Company v. Conboy, 495 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 608 (1983). See also, Hubbell, supra, quoted above as to what is encompassed by the phrase "in any criminal case" containe

he answers cannot possibly have such tendency to incriminate. gI at 488, 399. Recognizing the breadth and magnitude of this constitutional privilege, the United States Supreme Court in discussing how a court is to analyze the application of the privilege stated — ... It is for the court to say whether his silence

convict the witness of a crime or could aid in the development of other incriminating evidence that can be used at trial. Id; Pillsbury Company v. Conboy, 495 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 608 (1983). Certainly, if the USAO decides to prosecute EPSTEIN for an alleged violation of the NPA, it would undoubtedly

e answers cannot possibly have such tendency to incriminate. Id at 488, 399. Recognizing the breadth and magnitude of this constitutional privilege, the United States Supreme Court in discussing how a court is to analyze the application of the privilege stated — ... It is for the court to say whether his silence

1321(2f M24 C.M.A. v. Epstein, et al. Page 12 the development of other incriminating evidence that can be used at trial. Id; Pillsbury Company v. Conboy, 495 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 608 (1983). See also, Hubbell, supra, as to what is encompassed by the phrase "in any criminal case" contained in the Fifth

he answers cannot possibly have such tendency to incriminate. gI at 488, 399. Recognizing the breadth and magnitude of this constitutional privilege, the United States Supreme Court in discussing how a court is to analyze the application of the privilege stated — ... It is for the court to say whether his silence

convict the witness of a crime or could aid in the development of other incriminating evidence that can be used at trial. Id; Pillsbury Company v. Conboy, 495 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 608 (1983). Certainly, if the USAO decides to prosecute EPSTEIN for an alleged violation of the NPA, it would undoubtedly