Epstein Secrets

sues where Tehran has major interests. The possible linkage of the nuclear issue to Iran's broader diplomatic agenda is bound to be controversial. The United States and its allies have wanted to limit conversations to nuclear matters; Iran evidently seeks a diplomatic engagement that addresses a much wider rang

goes the adage, and that is good advice when it comes to thinking about Iran and its nuclear program. But it is just as important to remember the United States' own history in dealing with Tehran. Iranians do. "The majority, including the supreme leader, Ali Ithamenei, they EFTA_R1_02203684 EFTA02720372

te debt. Desperate for cash, the government issued "diaspora bonds" last March in an attempt to tap into the savings of the Egyptian expats in the Arab Gulf region. Though no official figures have been released, proceeds from the sales so far seem to fall very short of the $2 billion the government had

r Iran to attend, then rescinded it after strong objections from America; from Saudi Arabia, Iran's regional rival; and from the Syrian opposition. The United States has said that Iran could not participate without publicly accepting a 2012 communiqué that is the basis of the conference and stipulates that the g

e's competition, perhaps suspicion, but not an active or proxy warfare." This vision isn't going to mollify the suspicions of those concerned about Arab Gulf security. In December, Lpeculated that a "plausible, but still from an Arab point of view alarming, scenario is that the US is seeking to create a

at a minimum, cannot be relied on not to use them — and that Israel's very existence is at stake. After years of Israeli cajoling and blandishments, the United States and the European community have at last started to impose serious sanctions against Tehran, targeting its oil industries and central bank. But the

ort, despite the dispute over the Assad regime. If the Gaza leadership is to mount an effective pushback against this new initiative, which enjoys Arab Gulf backing, it is going to require significant support from Iran. The Iranians might have incentives to continue to fund Hamas in Gaza to try to sabot

regime's approach to those talks. President Bashar al-Assad's statements in recent days indicate that he and his backers are attempting to pressure the United States and the rest of the "London 11" countries supporting the opposition at the conference -- Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Qa

's competition, perhaps suspicion, but not an active or proxy warfare." This vision isn't going to mollify the suspicions of those concerned about Arab Gulf security. In December, I speculated that a "plausible, but still from an Arab point of view alarming, scenario is that the US is seeking to create

nderwater drones. The ships will stay out of the narrow Strait of Hormuz, to avoid direct interaction with Iran's navy. In advance of the exercise, the United States Navy earlier this summer doubled the number of minesweepers in the region, to eight vessels. The deployments are part of a larger series of military rei

ituent Assembly. Cairo realizes that there are still unsettled affairs between Egypt and Iran, most importantly regarding Iran's relations with the Arab Gulf countries and its support of the Syrian regime against dissidents there, notably Syria's Muslim Brotherhood. Concerning Iran's relations with the A

nts of their future state. In a June 2009 address in Cairo, a speech that asked for a "new beginning" with the Islamic world, Obama said: "The United States does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements." He also did not stop in Israel on that trip, instead visiting Saudi Arabia, Egypt a

l elements of their future state. In a June 2009 address in Cairo, a speech that asked for a "new beginning" with the Islamic world, Obama said: "The United States does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements." He also did not stop in Israel on that trip, instead visiting Saudi Arabia,

d Hamas joins the Palestinian Authority, Obama will be faced with an awkward decision on whether to meet with a government that includes members of a U.S.- designated terrorist movement. As he begins again in the region, Obama will be advised by new Secretary of State John F. Kerry. He has also named for

raq, having just ended a bitter eight-year war with Iran, would swing its battered forces south to invade Kuwait. So if it's conventional wisdom that the United States will not, or should not, intervene militarily in the Middle East or South Asia after it draws down forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, it's also likely d

gets the impression that even in such coverage of important initiatives, there’s invariably some reference or the other to discredited stereotypes of the Arab Gulf. Now the focus is on Dubai, and again the stereotypes are being brought up. It seems that any successful Arab model in economic development invites s

n order to raise the efficiency of education and medical services. This is what we see in industrialized countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland and others. Our experience in education foundered for many reasons, and we are racing against time to make up for what