Epstein Secrets

ly that any communication or movement, Snowden made during his next 18 days in Hong Kong would escape its scrutiny. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020338 187 The U.Ss also had the ability to track Snowden’s movements via the cell phones of his lawyers and other confederates after he surfaced. This tracking could al

wald, Poitras and MacAskill did not concern themselves with the issue of the mechanics of the largest theft of top secret documents in the history of the United States. In entire filmed interview at the Mira Hotel, they did not ask their source how he managed to get access to the documents. Unlike those interviews,

erational security about his contacts with her, but that injunction did not prevent her from telling at least five people about her source, including Micah Lee, the Berkeley- based technology operative for the Freedom of the Press Foundation; Jacob Appelbaum, the TOR proselytizer; Ben Wizner, the ACLU lawyer

ew, amass even greater power. Whatever his actual agenda in 2012, we know that he tested pos- sible reactions to a leak exposing NSA surveillance in the United States. He asked fellow workers at the NSA base in 2012, according to his own account, “What do you think the public would do if this [secret data] was on t

ade her vul- nerable to NSA surveillance. To get to her through an encrypted channel, Snowden chose a circuitous approach. On January 11, he wrote to Micah Lee in Berkeley, California. Given Lee’s residence in the United States, as Snowden knew, the NSA would be legally barred from monitoring his communicati

le awaiting his trial and was facing a long prison sentence. There was no reason for Snowden to expect a better outcome for himself if he returned to the United States or was arrested anywhere else that had an extradition treaty with the United States. As the Russian officials in Hong Kong would have informed him, R

rs in the anti-surveillance movement, including such well-known activists as Runa Sandvik (to whom he revealed his true name and address via e-mail), Micah Lee, Jacob Appelbaum, Parker Higgins, and Laura Poitras. “It is not statistically improbable that members of this circle were being watched by a hostile

on was its undisputed dominance in the business of obtaining and deciphering the communications of other nations. The NSA was the instrument by which the United States both protected its own secret communications and stole the secrets of foreign nations. The NSA, however, has an Achilles’s heel: It is dependent on c

erational security about his contacts with her, but that injunction did not prevent her from telling at least five people about her source, including Micah Lee, the Berkeley-based technology operative for the Freedom of the Press Foundation; Jacob Appelbaum, the Tor proselytizer; Ben Wizner, the ACLU lawyer;

his anonymous data was archived into a huge database. The idea was that when any foreigner on the FBI’s watch list of terrorists called any number in the United States, the FBI could trace that person’s entire chain of telephone contacts to try to determine if he or she was connected to a known terrorist cell. There

er film Citizenfour and published in Wired. See Greenberg, “These Are the Emails Snowden Sent to First Introduce His Epic NSA Leaks.” 63 he wrote to Micah Lee: Lee’s involvement with Snowden, although known to the journalists Greenwald and Poitras since April 2013, was not revealed to the pub- lic for some

whistle-blowing concept to adversaries was echoed by Russian President Vladimir Putin. He complimented Snowden for having “uncovered illegal acts by the United States around the globe,” Putin’s view implies a convenient global concept of whistle-blowing that justified breaking US laws. Even so, this whistle-blower

journalist. Like Poitras, he joined the board of directors of the Freedom of the Press Foundation. The foundation, which eventually Runa Sandvik and Micah Lee would join, had been set up expressly to funnel money to both Assange’s Wikileaks site and the defense fund for Bradley Manning after he was arrested