Epstein Secrets

le awaiting his trial and was facing a long prison sentence. There was no reason for Snowden to expect a better outcome for himself if he returned to the United States or was arrested anywhere else that had an extradition treaty with the United States. As the Russian officials in Hong Kong would have informed him, R

am headed by Richard “Rick” Ledgett, who was then director of the NSA’s Threat Opera- tions Center at the NSA’s headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland. Ledgett was the logical choice to head the damage assessment inves- tigation because the center’s regional branch in Hawaii was under his command. Ledgett fl

n camera in his Hong Kong interview in June 2013 that NSA investi- gators would have “a heart attack” when they discovered the extent of the breach. Ledgett, the NSA official who had conducted the damage assess- ment, while not having a heart attack, confirmed that Snowden had taken a massive number of do

his anonymous data was archived into a huge database. The idea was that when any foreigner on the FBI’s watch list of terrorists called any number in the United States, the FBI could trace that person’s entire chain of telephone contacts to try to determine if he or she was connected to a known terrorist cell. There

es to Russia.” 41 Physical Phatness: Lindsay Mills’s Facebook page, https://www.facebook.com /lindsay.mills.90/about. 42. the first known document: Ledgett revealed this in an interview with Vanity Fair. Burrough, Ellison, and Andrews, “Snowden Saga.” 42 “He stole the [NSA] test”: Snowden’s obtaining th

“I, Spy.” “was moving copies of that data”: Burrough, Ellison, and Andrews, “Snowden Saga.” 45 he later pointed out: Bamford, “Edward Snowden.” 45 Ledgett subsequently reported: Burrough, Ellison, and Andrews, “Snowden Saga.” 45 This theft was made: Michael Hayden, interview with author. 46 “Icrossed

ly that any communication or movement, Snowden made during his next 18 days in Hong Kong would escape its scrutiny. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020338 187 The U.Ss also had the ability to track Snowden’s movements via the cell phones of his lawyers and other confederates after he surfaced. This tracking could al

wald, Poitras and MacAskill did not concern themselves with the issue of the mechanics of the largest theft of top secret documents in the history of the United States. In entire filmed interview at the Mira Hotel, they did not ask their source how he managed to get access to the documents. Unlike those interviews,

se “bread crumbs” were missed by the NSA according to its statement. It is within the realm of possibility that the NSA Damage Assessment team under Ledgett falsified its finding to inflate the number of documents that Snowden stole. NSA executives also might have lied to Congress to the same end. But why

ew, amass even greater power. Whatever his actual agenda in 2012, we know that he tested pos- sible reactions to a leak exposing NSA surveillance in the United States. He asked fellow workers at the NSA base in 2012, according to his own account, “What do you think the public would do if this [secret data] was on t

ell was transferring files held at Fort Meade to backup computers in Hawaii. He “was moving copies of that data there for them,” said Deputy Director Ledgett, “which was perfect cover for stealing the [NSA] data” through the fall and winter of 2012. The security mea- sures at the Hawaii base presented no o

whistle-blowing concept to adversaries was echoed by Russian President Vladimir Putin. He complimented Snowden for having “uncovered illegal acts by the United States around the globe,” Putin’s view implies a convenient global concept of whistle-blowing that justified breaking US laws. Even so, this whistle-blower

position since the top- secret unit was responsible for discovering and countering the threats posed by Chinese, Russian and other adversary nations. Ledgett was also the logical choice to head the damage assessment investigation since the Center’s regional branch in Hawaii was from where highly-sensitive