Epstein Secrets

hat they were members of conspiracy pursuant to New York long-arm statute, or that they had any general business contacts with United States. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331 et seq.; N.Y.McKinney's CPLR 302(a)(2). 68. Federal Courts C=97 Jurisdictional discovery was warrant- ed, at dismissal stage of Antiterrori

rrorism Act (ATA) suit by survivors of victims of September 11, 2001 attacks, as to issue whether company purposefully directed its activities at United Slates, for purposes of personal jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331 et seq.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 12(b)(2), 28 U.S.CA. 101. Federal Civil Procedure (3=

ts with the United States generally, but in- sufficient contacts with any one state in particular. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k)(2) advisory committee's note; United Stales v. Intl. Bhd, of Teamsters, 945 F.Supp. 609, 616- 17 (S.D.N.Y.1996). For jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2), there must be a federal claim, personal

dismissed for lack of per- sonal jurisdiction. 3. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Jurisdic- tional Discovery as to Privatbank's Investing Activities in the United States [37] Plaintiffs point out that Privat- bank's website and its 2001 Annual Report state that Privatbank engages in transac- tions involving securiti

some conceivable non-discretionary tortious act falls within the purview of these generic allegations under the appli- cable substantive law. 28 U.S.C.A. 1605(a)(5). 28. International Law C=10.33 In determining whether functions are discretionary, for purposes of the discre- tionary function except

SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 827 Cite as 349 F.Supp-2d 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 10068(MBM), 2003 WL 21664679, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2003) (quoting Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir.1983)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1962. "Civil RICO is an unusually potent weapon ... 'courts should strive to flush out frivo-

the proposition that a 'scheme to defraud describes a category of unethical or unfair practices broad enough to capture post-transaction marketing. See United States v. Warshak. 631 F.3d 266. 311 (6th Cir. 2010) ("Mhe scheme to defraud element required under Section 1341 is not defined according to a technical st

n, or maintains and interest in, or participates in (6) an 'enterprise' (7) the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce." Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c)). And to state a RICO conspiracy, a plaintiff must allege "the existence of an agree

fficient con- tacts with the United States as a whole but is not subject to jurisdiction in any particu- lar state, requires contacts with the United States as a whole. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 4(k)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. 50. Constitutional Law ¢=305(5) The due process minimum contacts

has sufficient con- tacts with the United States as a whole but is not subject to jurisdiction in any particu- lar state, requires contacts with the United States as a whole. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 4(k)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. 50. Constitutional Law ¢=305(5) The due process minimum co

t, but in the manner of a private player within it, the foreign sover- eign’s actions are ‘commercial’ within the meaning of the FSIA.” Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614, 112 S.Ct. 2160. Courts must in- quire whether the foreign state’s actions “are the type of actions by which a private party engages in trade a

Teamsters, 945 F.Supp. at 617. a. Purposefully Directed Activities Theory Personal jurisdiction based on Rule 4(k) requires minimum contacts with the Unit- ed States to satisfy Fifth Amendment due process requirements. Plaintiffs claim these requirements are met because De- fendants purposefully directed their ac