Epstein Secrets

istent with how our circuit and others have articulated the doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Villasenor. 608 F.3d 467. 471-72 (9th Cir.2010); United Stales v. Yang, 286 F.3d 940.945-46 (7th Cir.2002); United States v. Hyde, 37 F.3d 116. 120 n. 2 (3d Cit 1994); United States v. Santiago, 837 F.2d 1545.

010). Reasonable suspicion is required precisely because the individual has regained an expectation of privacy by moving away from the border. See United Slates v. Villasenor. 608 F.3d 467.471-72 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, —U.S., 131 S.Ct. 547. 178 L.Ed.2d 401 (2010); United States v. Whiting. 781 F.2d 692.

bing a functional border search and those describing an extended border search, not in defining the standard for a search at the border. See, e.g., United States v. Cardona, 769 F.2d 625, 628 (9th Cir.1985) ("We have recently recognized the difficulty of making sharp distinctions between searches at the func

he Court has expressed support for the deterrence value of suspicionless searches of a routine nature, such as vehicle checkpoints near the border. See United States v. Maninez— Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) ("We note here only the substantiality of the public interest in the p

the circumstances because it dismisses without explanation numerous factors that weigh against a finding of reasonable suspicion in this case. See Manzo—Jurado, 457 F.3d at 938 (the reasonable suspicion determination must "take[ into account both factors weighing for and against reasonable suspicio

6, 1998, at BS. 22 Victims' Rights Amendment. Hearing on S.J. Res. 6 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. 64 (1997) (statement of Janet Reno, U.S. Att'y Gen.). 30 See www.nveap.org (last visted Dec. 30, 2007). 3! For a comprehensive history of victims' efforts to pass a constitutional amendment,

able to reflect the new role of victims throughout the Rules. Moreover, Congress intended the CVRA to be "a formula for success" and a "model for our States." + The only way the federal rules could serve as a model, I argued, was by fully implementing victims’ rights. I then proposed twenty-eight specific

witnesses."). 441 See, e.g., United States v. Pearson, 340 F.3d 459, 468 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Bejasa, 904 F.2d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Barrett, 766 F.2d 609, 617 (ist Cir. 1985); United States v. Conder, 423 F.2d 904, 910 (6th Cir. 1970). 342 631 F.2d 951, 954-55 (9th Cir.

gly expects this to happen. Congress adopted the CVRA with the express goal of making the new law "a formula [*855] for success" and a "model for our States." 111 Congress clearly wants the new law aggressively implemented, thereby avoiding the need for further legislative action or even, possibly, a fede

Rec. $10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphases added). 247 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 248 150 Cong. Rec. $4264 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis added). 249 See 18 U.S.C. 3509(h)(