Epstein Secrets

istent with how our circuit and others have articulated the doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Villasenor. 608 F.3d 467. 471-72 (9th Cir.2010); United Stales v. Yang, 286 F.3d 940.945-46 (7th Cir.2002); United States v. Hyde, 37 F.3d 116. 120 n. 2 (3d Cit 1994); United States v. Santiago, 837 F.2d 1545.

010). Reasonable suspicion is required precisely because the individual has regained an expectation of privacy by moving away from the border. See United Slates v. Villasenor. 608 F.3d 467.471-72 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, —U.S., 131 S.Ct. 547. 178 L.Ed.2d 401 (2010); United States v. Whiting. 781 F.2d 692.

bing a functional border search and those describing an extended border search, not in defining the standard for a search at the border. See, e.g., United States v. Cardona, 769 F.2d 625, 628 (9th Cir.1985) ("We have recently recognized the difficulty of making sharp distinctions between searches at the func

he Court has expressed support for the deterrence value of suspicionless searches of a routine nature, such as vehicle checkpoints near the border. See United States v. Maninez— Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) ("We note here only the substantiality of the public interest in the p

5 U.S. 1176, 129 S.Ct. 1312. 173 L.Ed.2d 595 (2009), we held that laptops are like other property, relying on the reasoning and language in Flores— Montano, Chaudhry, and Cortez—Rocha discussed above (among other cases). Similarly, in United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 503-07 (4th Cir.2005), the Fou

onceal and coverup and to cause to be concealed and covered up material facts in a matter within the jurisdiction of the Department of Treasury of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976). The indictment specifically alleged that Tobon concealed and caused to he con- cealed the existence, sour

- ed nothing more than a scheme to prevent the financial institutions from fulfilling their legal duty to file reports for these transactions. In United States' Thompson, 603 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir.1979) that court adopted a sensible, substance-over-form approach in dealing with schemes to circumvent finan- ci

s aboard the DANNY as that of a crewman. In addi- tion, a Coast Guard officer noted that, when describing the mysterious departure of the captain, Montano stated that he had the responsibility of steering the vessel to its intended destination. Thus, the defend- ants' own statements tend to refute the

U.S. v. Montano, 873 F.Supp. 1177 (1995) 873 F.Supp. 1177 United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v

in this regard seeks to prevent the government from playing the tapes unless Granata testifies. The court finds the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.1991), instructive. In McClain, the Seventh Circuit approved admission of tapes even where the government did not