Epstein Secrets

US DeP•Mlilla I tr4 tram Race.” Fodor& AulaSciti Attailnistratien 08-80736-CV-MARRA RFP WPB 001697 EFTA00209876 U.S. Department of Justice United Slates Attorney Southern District of Florida 500 South Australian Ave., Suite 400 West Palm Beach, FL 3340! (361)820-8711 Facsimile: (561)820-8777 May

ta United States Att A. Marie Assistant United States Attorney 08-80736-CV-MARRA RFP WPB 001698 EFTA00209877 05/15/2007 16:57 FAX 5618021787 USA0 WPB FL gaol TX REPORT IX#i TRANSMISSION OK Sals *****Atii************* TX/RX NO 4676 CONNECTION TEL 8358691 SUBADDRESS CONNECTION ID ST.

a result of the federal investigation], or acquittal on the merits shall be a bar to any subsequent federal prosecution for the same act or acts." U.S.A.M. § 9-2.031A (emphasis added). Consistent with that principle, and of particular relevance to this case, the Department itself just recently observed

inding that the defendant had an intent to persuade or to attempt to persuade.' United States I Murrell 368 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing United States'. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 638-39 (6th Cir.2000)). Thus, the targeted criminal conduct must occur through the interstate facility, not thereafter, and

A00209852 KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP Congress to speak more clearly and keeps courts from making criminal law in Congress's stead." Slip op. at 6.I In Cuellar, the Court examined the link between the money-laundering statute's mens rea requirement and the underlying elements of the offense. After a careful

o Suprems Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen'. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seeing such elasticity in federal criminal statutes, including those enacted to protect important fede

ction 2422(b) expressly requires that the crime be committed "knowingly," and that requisite mental element applies as to each element of the crime. United Slates v, XCitement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68.69 (1994); United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 718 (9lh Cir. 2004); United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222,

imited to sex trafficking that involves children or is accomplished by force, fraud, or coercion." United States v. Evans 476 F.3d at 1179 n. 1. Sec aho United States v, Sims, 171 Fed. 3505-019 Page 19 of 63 SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER PARAGRAPHS 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, and 17 EFTA_00003291 EFTA00157673 ALLEN GUTHR

a result of the federal investigation], or acquittal on the merits shall be a bar to any subsequent federal prosecution for the same act or acts." U.S.A.M. § 9-2.031A (emphasis added). Consistent with that principle, and of particular relevance to this case, the Department itself just recently observed

ically underscore these principles and help to highlight why federal prosecution in this case would be improper as a matter of both law and policy. See United States v. Santos, No. 06-1005 (June 2, 2008); Cuellar v. United States, No. 06-1456 (June 2, 2008). Though they both address the interpretation and applica

it is not in accord with the principles of justice. Indeed, as noted, just a few weeks ago, the Supreme Court underscored this point in Santos and Cuellar. The Court made clear that prosecutorial discretion does not provide the USAO cart blanche to expand criminal statutes as they seek to do here with

upreme Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen v. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seeing such elasticity in federal criminal statutes, including those enacted to protect important fede

a result of the federal investigation], or acquittal on the merits shall be a bar to any subsequent federal prosecution for the same act or acts." U.S.A.M. § 9-2.031A (emphasis added). Consistent with that principle, and of particular relevance to this case, the Department itself just recently observed

, that amounts to solicitation under State law. After all, prostitution, even when the allegations involve minors, is fundamentally a State concern, United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, n.1 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that federal law "does not criminalize all acts of prostitution (a vice traditionally governed

ically underscore these principles and help to highlight why federal prosecution in this case would be improper as a matter of both law and policy. See United States v. Santos, No. 06-1005 (June 2, 2008); Cuellar v. United States, No. 06-1456 (June 2, 2008). Though they both address the interpretation and applica

sufficient—cannot survive either a "plain language" test or the rule of lenity as they have been authoritatively construed in the recent Santos and Cuellar cases. The statute cannot be read otherwise. As the Cuellar decision makes clear, a proper interpretation of a federal criminal statute is guided "

upreme Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen v. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seeing such elasticity in federal criminal statutes, including those enacted to protect important fede

o lie because Mr. Epstein had an actual practice of attempting to verify age, and would not let them in his house if they were under the age of 18. ss& United States v. Kennard, 472 F.3d 851, 857-858 (11th Cir. 2006), quoting, United States v. Puche 350 F.3d 1137, 1149 (111° Cir. 2003) (An instruction on delibera

ction 2422(b) expressly requires that the crime be committed "knowingly," and that requisite mental element applies as to each element of the crime. United States v. XCitement Video. Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68-69 (1994); United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 718 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222,

it is not in accord with the principles of justice. Indeed, as noted, just a few weeks ago, the Supreme Court underscored this point in Santos and Cuellar. The Court made clear that prosecutorial discretion does not provide the USAO cart blanche to expand criminal statutes as they seek to do here with

to the facts in this case. Importantly, we note that the CEOS review was conducted prior to the Supreme Court’s very recent decisions in Santos and Cuellar, which we believe—illuminating as they do the Court’s interpretive methodology when it comes to federal criminal law—powerfully demonstrate the subst

iminal statutes, including those enacted to protect important federal interests. In cases involving the federalization of activity that is within the States’ historic police power, Congress must speak with particular clarity. See, e.g., Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989). 12

tter points out (CEOS letter at p. 3), I was a member of CEOS. In fact, I served as a federal prosecutor for twelve years; five years as an Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of West Virginia, and seven years at CEOS. I began working as a trial attorney for CEOS in 1999, and was pr