Epstein Secrets

/ BARAK / 15 By November, even his Foreign Minister, David Levy, was making noises about quitting. He said it would be a waste of time to stay in the cabine

ed his no-confidence resolution, he came to see me in my office in the Knesset. He was worried. Not about the vote, but about what would come after. “Ehud, I’m sure we can topple the government,” he told me. “But only you know whether we’re ready — whether you ’re ready — to defeat Bibi in an election.”

ace. The proof of that is that when he was Chief of Staff, he was the only senior officer to oppose the Oslo Agreement.” I summoned my security team: Mofaz as chief of staff; the heads of military intelligence, Mossad and the Shin Bet. I told them that Arafat was wrong. My inalterable “red line” would al

/ BARAK / 15 By November, even his Foreign Minister, David Levy, was making noises about quitting. He said it would be a waste of time to stay in the cabinet

ed his no-confidence resolution, he came to see me in my office in the Knesset. He was worried. Not about the vote, but about what would come after. "Ehud, I'm sure we can topple the government," he told me. "But only you know whether we're ready - whether you're ready - to defeat Bibi in an election."

ace. The proof of that is that when he was Chief of Staff, he was the only senior officer to oppose the Oslo Agreement." I summoned my security team: Mofaz as chief of staff; the heads of military intelligence, Mossad and the Shin Bet. I told them that Arafat was wrong. My inalterable "red line" would al

n early 2006 did not kill that plan, and indeed, Ehud Olmert ran and won on something like it when he

ve Netanyahu facing two alternatives: continue economic and institutional development in the West Bank without talks, or undertake a Sharon/Olmert/Mofaz move in the West Bank. Netanyahu's government could adopt some combination of consolidating (perhaps even annexing) the major settlement blocs whi