Epstein Secrets

Census Count Conducted 3:00 PM -9 I/M Delgado #77202-112, Garcia #86290-054, Kim #86202-054, Mendoza 086913-054, Pena #76203-054, Reid #74801-054, Richardson #86137-054, Rivera #76177-054, Zamora 176050-054 781 76/5 1:15 PM +3 I/M Brown #70786-050, Marshall #11867-087, Quiroga #86210-054 784 76/5 1:20

commit: Hallwood #63577-054, Latimer #79427-054 114 69/5 8:30 PM Trash run in progress 9:00 PM 2 inmates escorted from GN to IA: Rosa #86324-054, Urena A28631- 054. ( Phone charger, cable, sharpened weapon, Amephetamines 71/5 9:25 PM Trash run complete 10:00 PM Institutional count in progress. 10

3) 146 United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102 (2007) 227, 235 United States v. Ricco, 549 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1977) 61 United States v. Richardson, 512 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1975) 49 United States v. Richardson, 537 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2008) 293 United States v. Rioux, 930 F. Supp. 1558 (D. Co

e aprima facie showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." United States v. Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations omitted). Here, the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture that some unspecifie

or Victim-2 to testify about her abuse twice. Cl Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (recognizing

ule 16 of making "a prima facie showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 261 (citations omitted). Because the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture, based on an inaccurate and hearsay-

. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) 115, 116, 118 Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) 165 Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) 116 Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) 212 Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1991) 168, 172 Rochin, 342 U.S., 72 S. Ct. 205 153 Rosencra

e a prima fade showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." United States v. Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations omitted). Here, the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture that some unspecifie

r Victim-2 to testify about her abuse twice. Cf. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (recognizing

Rule 16 of making "a prima fade showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 261 (citations omitted). Because the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture, based on an inaccurate and hearsay-

. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) 115, 116, 118 Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) 165 Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) 116 Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) 212 Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1991) 168, 172 Rochin, 342 U.S., 72 S. Ct. 205 153 Rosencra

e a prima fade showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." United States v. Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations omitted). Here, the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture that some unspecifie

r Victim-2 to testify about her abuse twice. Cf. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (recognizing

Rule 16 of making "a prima fade showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 261 (citations omitted). Because the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture, based on an inaccurate and hearsay-

s v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102 (2007) 150, 155 xviii EFTA00095085 United States v. Ricco, 549 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1977) 42 United States v. Richardson, 512 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1975) 36 United States v. Richardson, 537 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2008) 200 United States v. Rioux, 930 F. Supp. 1558 (D. Co

e a prima fade showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." United States v. Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations omitted). Here, the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture that some unspecifie

r Victim-2 to testify about her abuse twice. Cf. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (recognizing

ule 16 of making "a prima facie showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 261 (citations omitted). Because the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture, based on an inaccurate and hearsay-

. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) 115, 116, 118 Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) 165 Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) 116 Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) 212 Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1991) 168, 172 Rochin, 342 U.S., 72 S. Ct. 205 153 Rosencra

a prima facie showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." United States v. Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations omitted). Here, the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture that some unspecifie