Epstein Secrets

of the Middle East and want to go home. Problems don't fade away just because you don't want to deal with them anymore. Walter Russell Mead is the Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and one of the country's leading students of American foreign polic

nation's right to exist. Let me narrate a strange story of American deceit. When Henry Kissinger met Sadat and introduced his six-point plan as a `Kissinger plan,' Sadat told him: "Never forget, Dr. Kissinger, I am making this agreement with the United States, not with Israel." EFTA00675620 However,

`Kissinger plan,' Sadat told him: "Never forget, Dr. Kissinger, I am making this agreement with the United State

e United States on certain issues. That came just days after Saudi Arabia stunned even some of its own diplomats when it refused a rotating seat on the United Nations Security Council, citing its anger over the world's failure to respond to the crisis in Syria. This spat reflects the Arab world's deepening frustration with Americ

a and Iran to stop enabling Mr. Assad's savagery. The Washington Post rian intervention is justifiable, and just Anne-Marie Slaughter June 9 -- Henry Kissinger recently argued against intervention in Syria ["The perils of intervention in Syria," Sunday Opinion, June 3] on the grounds that it would imperil

violence in Iraq resulted in large part from the U.S. determination to destroy those institutions along with Saddam Hussein. As a cautionary tale, Kissinger and others point not only to Iraq but also to Libya. Kissinger lumped Libya in with Yemen, Somalia and northern Mali as a "blank space" on the map

Kofi Annan, the special envoy to Syria for the United Nations and the Arab League. All it has done is give Russia, China and some other members of the United Nations Security Council six more weeks to excuse their inaction. On Thursday, Mr. Annan told the Security Council that the savagery will increase without concerted intern

rol agreement negotiated during the height of détente in the 1970s escaped the critical eye of the hawkish Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.), who forced Henry Kissinger to renegotiate, reconsider and even abrogate various provisions of his contemplated agreements. Two presidents, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon,

sh Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.), who forced Henry Kissinger to renegotiate, reconsider and even abrogate var

n of a two-track policy of steadily increasing economic pressure on Iran while seeking a diplomatic settlement of the nuclear issue. Rice marshaled the United Nations Security Council to repeatedly censure Iran and demand that it suspend all of its nuclear activities. The Treasury Department, meanwhile, pursued an imaginative pol

the parties to something like binding arbitration, stop speaking about psychological breakthrough, and start implementing American policy—more Dr. Kissinger, less Dr. Phil. The breakdown Kerry described, after all, is not in actual negotiations but in a contrived show of reciprocity that masks how negot

own. They are consistent with American policy since 1967. If packaged as an American plan, they'd likely gain the support of the European Union and the United Nations Security Council. All Kerry has to do—not a small thing—is embrace them and call them his own, much as President Obama haltingly did in 2011, when he argued for "th