Epstein Secrets

central role meant the threat to Israel would be dramatically reduced. I’m much less sure whether the elder President Bush, whose election defeat to Bill Clinton came just two days before our final exercise in the Negev, would have agreed with the attack. After the victory in the Gulf War, Bush had deliberatel

ut international politics. I remember one afternoon in the summer of 1992 when he mentioned the then US presidential candidate Bill Clinton. He’d met Clinton for the first time in Washington, after two days of talks with President Bush at his summer home in Maine. Rabin was naturally more comfortable deali

ld go on to forge a much closer relationship with President Clinton than between any previous Israeli and US leader.

journalist Ron Pundak. Three PLO officials were there, led by Arafat’s closest economic aide, Abu Ala’a. Though both of the Israelis were friends of Yossi Beilin, a protégé of Peres and our deputy foreign minister, even Peres didn’t know about the meeting until Yossi told him the following day. Rabin knew an h

l beyond the diplomacy of the Middle East: science, music, and our shared interest in history. What most struck Nava and me, however, was the way the Clintons interacted with each other. The scandal surrounding Monica Lewinsky was still fresh. I suppose we expected to see signs of tension. Whether they were

ing and running the election campaign. We met at Labor headquarters in Milbank Towers so Philip could show me the “war room” — modelled, in part, on Bill Clinton’s campaign operation — from which the victory had been planned and executed. It was a large, open-plan space, nothing like the warren of offices and co

to revive it, we were running against the clock. President Clinton, a key player in any hope of turning the promise

e city of Jerusalem. I was not opposed to the Palestinians calling Jerusalem the capital of their state. But even in follow-up talks after Oslo, when Yossi Beilin and Abu Mazen had explored avenues toward a possible resolution of the Jerusalem question, the maximum understanding was that Israel might expand the

central role meant the threat to Israel would be dramatically reduced. I'm much less sure whether the elder President Bush, whose election defeat to Bill Clinton came just two days before our final exercise in the Negev, would have agreed with the attack. After the victory in the Gulf War, Bush had deliberatel

ut international politics. I remember one afternoon in the summer of 1992 when he mentioned the then US presidential candidate Bill Clinton. He'd met Clinton for the first time in Washington, after two days of talks with President Bush at his summer home in Maine. Rabin was naturally more comfortable deali

ld go on to forge a much closer relationship with President Clinton than between any previous Israeli and US leader.

journalist Ron Pundak. Three PLO officials were there, led by Arafat's closest economic aide, Abu Ala'a. Though both of the Israelis were friends of Yossi Beilin, a protégé of Peres and our deputy foreign minister, even Peres didn't know about the meeting until Yossi told him the following day. Rabin knew an h

l beyond the diplomacy of the Middle East: science, music, and our shared interest in history. What most struck Nava and me, however, was the way the Clintons interacted with each other. The scandal surrounding Monica Lewinsky was still fresh. I suppose we expected to see signs of tension. Whether they were

ning and running the election campaign. We met at Labor headquarters in Milbank Towers so Philip could show me the "war room" - modelled, in part, on Bill Clinton's campaign operation - from which the victory had been planned and executed. It was a large, open-plan space, nothing like the warren of offices and co

to revive it, we were running against the clock. President Clinton, a key player in any hope of turning the promise

e city of Jerusalem. I was not opposed to the Palestinians calling Jerusalem the capital of their state. But even in follow-up talks after Oslo, when Yossi Beilin and Abu Mazen had explored avenues toward a possible resolution of the Jerusalem question, the maximum understanding was that Israel might expand the

an conflict. read more: http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/culture/.premium-1.730197 On September 13, 1993, on the White House lawn, U.S. President Bill Clinton presided over one of history's more awkward but momentous handshakes. A new play, "Oslo," premiering Monday at New York City's Lincoln Center, bring

993, on the White House lawn, U.S. President Bill Clinton presided over one of history's more awkward but

rsight of officials on both sides. He thus formed enduring relationships with various senior figures and policymakers, including Israeli politician Yossi Beilin who would play a key role in the future secret negotiations. After returning to Norway, Juul worked for the Foreign Ministry and Rod-Larsen returned

suicide bombings and growing Israeli settlement building proved neither side was actively implementing the peace agreements. In 1998, US President Bill Clinton invited Israeli Prime Minister Banjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat to sign an agreement to implement the procedures outlined in

Geneva Accords (2003) In 2002, George W. Bush became the first US president to overtly call for the creation of a Palestinian state, following on Clinton's suggestions that peace was impossible without the creation of a Palestinian state. A year later, the United States, Russia, the European Union an

would be discussed at an international conference. Finally, the final peace agreement would be signed. Some weeks after the roadmap was proposed, Yossi Beilin, one of the Israeli negotiators of the Oslo accords and former Palestinian Information Minister Yasser Abed Rabbo agreed upon an unofficial plan in

ot equal progress Both Kerry and Secretary Hillary Clinton before him have operated on the "mileage plus" model of diplomacy, traveling constantly. Clinton even trumpeted it as a major achievement. There is advantage to showing up, but it is not the central element of a secretary's job nor the appropri

enty years, when Netanyahu's Likud was out of power, Abbas conducted direct negotiations with Israeli leaders: first with Labor's Justice Minister, Yossi Beilin, in 1995, and then with centrist Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, in 2008. Twice, Abbas endorsed principles of action on the core issues proposed by Isr

1995) 441 Sharm el-Sheikh Summit of Peacemakers Final Statement (13 March 1996) 454 Camp David Statement (25 July 2000) 456 Remarks by US President Bill Clinton and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in Delivery of Joint Statements at the Conclusion of the Middle East Peace Summit (17 October 2000) 458 Clinton

ber 1998 Wye River Agreement signed by Arafat and Netanyahu. 14 December 1998 The Palestinian National Council convenes in the presence of President Clinton to reaffirm the annulling of clauses of the Palestinian Charter which denied Israel’s right to exist. 7 February 1999 King Hussein of Jordan dies. A

12/9/2014, SPi xxiv Chronology 15 December 1999 President Clinton hosts summit meeting with Israel’s Prime Minister

uent talks between the parties. In 1992, as the director of the Norwegian research institute Fafo, I initiated, together with then member of Knesset Yossi Beilin, secret talks between him and local Palestinian leader Faisal Husseini, at the American Colony Hotel in Jerusalem. These talks, which were facilitate