Epstein Secrets

re. I remember similar logic in the summer of 1998, when the accepted mantra was that the US would bail out Russia and Boris Yeltsin, since President Clinton would not want to see a nuclear power like Russia slide back into Soviet rule, or anarchy (that view turned out to be wrong). Anyone market-weight Eu

US would bail out Russia and Boris Yeltsin, since President Clinton would not want to see a nuclear power like Russia

re eventually shut down after the ECB (for now) rejected being the buyer of last resort for Italian government bonds, as the markets were hoping. The Bundesbank apparently has objections to the idea. This is a problem: Italy has issued around as much public debt as Germany, but is a considerably smaller count

re. I remember similar logic in the summer of 1998, when the accepted mantra was that the US would bail out Russia and Boris Yeltsin, since President Clinton would not want to see a nuclear power like Russia slide back into Soviet rule, or anarchy (that view turned out to be wrong). Anyone market-weight Eu

US would bail out Russia and Boris Yeltsin, since President Clinton would not want to see a nuclear power like Russia

re eventually shut down after the ECB (for now) rejected being the buyer of last resort for Italian government bonds, as the markets were hoping. The Bundesbank apparently has objections to the idea. This is a problem: Italy has issued around as much public debt as Germany, but is a considerably smaller count

re. I remember similar logic in the summer of 1998, when the accepted mantra was that the US would bail out Russia and Boris Yeltsin, since President Clinton would not want to see a nuclear power like Russia slide back into Soviet rule, or anarchy (that view turned out to be wrong). Anyone market-weight Eu

US would bail out Russia and Boris Yeltsin, since President Clinton would not want to see a nuclear power like Russia

re eventually shut down after the ECB (for now) rejected being the buyer of last resort for Italian government bonds, as the markets were hoping. The Bundesbank apparently has objections to the idea. This is a problem: Italy has issued around as much public debt as Germany, but is a considerably smaller count

12 and demanded that the United States take military action against Assad to remove him from power. These were the same two voices that lobbied the Clinton and Bush administrations to topple Saddam Hussein's regime. When the United States did exactly as these senators advocated, countless unintended n

ht be unable to do so in practice, if the runs it had to deal with were large enough. What, people must wonder, is the limit on the credit that the Bundesbank would be willing (or allowed) to offer other central banks in a massive run? In a severe crisis, could even the ECB, let alone the governments, act

ng the nuclear threshold. When Islamabad did eventually EFTA_R1_00482797 EFTA01990229 break out, testing its first nuclear devices in 1998, the Clinton administration condemned the action and then went about quietly adjusting itself to the new reality in South Asia. The lesson Barak absorbed, accor

ing by the European Central Bank; refusal to support mutual liability for debt; and, finally, the transformation of the ECB from a copy of the old Bundesbank into a European Federal Reserve Bank based on the Anglo-Saxon model. What remains is the rejection of Eurobonds, but that, too, will ultimately di

akistan from crossing the nuclear threshold. When Islamabad did eventually break out, testing its first nuclear devices EFTA00711873 in 1998, the Clinton administration condemned the action and then went about quietly adjusting itself to the new reality in South Asia. The lesson Barak absorbed, accor

opean Central Bank; refusal to support EFTA00711886 mutual liability for debt; and, finally, the transformation of the ECB from a copy of the old Bundesbank into a European Federal Reserve Bank based on the Anglo-Saxon model. What remains is the rejection of Eurobonds, but that, too, will ultimately di