Epstein Secrets

central role meant the threat to Israel would be dramatically reduced. I’m much less sure whether the elder President Bush, whose election defeat to Bill Clinton came just two days before our final exercise in the Negev, would have agreed with the attack. After the victory in the Gulf War, Bush had deliberatel

ut international politics. I remember one afternoon in the summer of 1992 when he mentioned the then US presidential candidate Bill Clinton. He’d met Clinton for the first time in Washington, after two days of talks with President Bush at his summer home in Maine. Rabin was naturally more comfortable deali

ld go on to forge a much closer relationship with President Clinton than between any previous Israeli and US leader.

HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011754 votes: one for a party list and one for a directly elected Prime Minister. This would be a personal test, an opportunity for Shimon to build on the still-tenuous achievement of Oslo and finally secure the endorsement of the Israeli people. It seemed, for a while, I might even hav

had made Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres. Though the two men had grown to respect each another over the years, Rabin neither trusted, nor much liked, Shimon. In fact, though Peres’s support inside Labor had secured him the foreign ministry, Rabin had stipulated that all peace talks would remain under his

l beyond the diplomacy of the Middle East: science, music, and our shared interest in history. What most struck Nava and me, however, was the way the Clintons interacted with each other. The scandal surrounding Monica Lewinsky was still fresh. I suppose we expected to see signs of tension. Whether they were

ing and running the election campaign. We met at Labor headquarters in Milbank Towers so Philip could show me the “war room” — modelled, in part, on Bill Clinton’s campaign operation — from which the victory had been planned and executed. It was a large, open-plan space, nothing like the warren of offices and co

to revive it, we were running against the clock. President Clinton, a key player in any hope of turning the promise

’d agree on a unity government. To my amusement, if not altogether to my surprise, I got word that Bibi was putting out separate political feelers to Shimon Peres. But before long, it became clear there was a specific political motivation behind his approaching me. It was indeed the peace process. But it

And while I did make a brief attempt to return as party leader later in the year, when it was clear I wasn’t going to win, I threw my support behind Shimon and against the other challenger, the longtime labor- union leader Amir Peretz, who was running on a platform to take Labor out of Sharon’s governmen

central role meant the threat to Israel would be dramatically reduced. I'm much less sure whether the elder President Bush, whose election defeat to Bill Clinton came just two days before our final exercise in the Negev, would have agreed with the attack. After the victory in the Gulf War, Bush had deliberatel

ut international politics. I remember one afternoon in the summer of 1992 when he mentioned the then US presidential candidate Bill Clinton. He'd met Clinton for the first time in Washington, after two days of talks with President Bush at his summer home in Maine. Rabin was naturally more comfortable deali

ld go on to forge a much closer relationship with President Clinton than between any previous Israeli and US leader.

HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028131 votes: one for a party list and one for a directly elected Prime Minister. This would be a personal test, an opportunity for Shimon to build on the still-tenuous achievement of Oslo and finally secure the endorsement of the Israeli people. It seemed, for a while, I might even have

had made Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres. Though the two men had grown to respect each another over the years, Rabin neither trusted, nor much liked, Shimon. In fact, though Peres's support inside Labor had secured him the foreign ministry, Rabin had stipulated that all peace talks would remain under his

l beyond the diplomacy of the Middle East: science, music, and our shared interest in history. What most struck Nava and me, however, was the way the Clintons interacted with each other. The scandal surrounding Monica Lewinsky was still fresh. I suppose we expected to see signs of tension. Whether they were

ning and running the election campaign. We met at Labor headquarters in Milbank Towers so Philip could show me the "war room" - modelled, in part, on Bill Clinton's campaign operation - from which the victory had been planned and executed. It was a large, open-plan space, nothing like the warren of offices and co

to revive it, we were running against the clock. President Clinton, a key player in any hope of turning the promise

'd agree on a unity government. To my amusement, if not altogether to my surprise, I got word that Bibi was putting out separate political feelers to Shimon Peres. But before long, it became clear there was a specific political motivation behind his approaching me. It was indeed the peace process. But it

GHT_028163 / BARAK / 30 I'd tried not to pay too much attention to newspaper polls during the campaign, perhaps because even the "good" ones, to use Shimon's phrase, had me with just a narrow lead, with Yitzhik Mordechai's 10 or 11 percent still likely to prevent outright victory in the first round. But

ut he was unquestionably committed to America’s alliance with Israel. I had dealt face-to-face with four US presidents: both of the Bushes, President Clinton and now President Obama. In terms of Israeli security, none had proved as consistently supportive and helpful as Obama. And yes, Israel did face an a

face with four US presidents: both of the Bushes, President Clinton and now President Obama. In terms of Israeli secu

I told a television interviewer that the government had every right to respond and was doing so effectively. Olmert phoned to thank me. When he, like Shimon, asked what I thought the government should do next, I was straightforward: “Do your best to bring things to an end as soon as you can.” I said that

ut he was unquestionably committed to America's alliance with Israel. I had dealt face-to-face with four US presidents: both of the Bushes, President Clinton and now President Obama. In terms of Israeli security, none had proved as consistently supportive and helpful as Obama. And yes, Israel did face an a

face with four US presidents: both of the Bushes, President Clinton and now President Obama. In terms of Israeli secu

I told a television interviewer that the government had every right to respond and was doing so effectively. Olmert phoned to thank me. When he, like Shimon, asked what I thought the government should do next, I was straightforward: "Do your best to bring things to an end as soon as you can." I said that

1995) 441 Sharm el-Sheikh Summit of Peacemakers Final Statement (13 March 1996) 454 Camp David Statement (25 July 2000) 456 Remarks by US President Bill Clinton and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in Delivery of Joint Statements at the Conclusion of the Middle East Peace Summit (17 October 2000) 458 Clinton

Casablanca Declaration. 30 November 1994 Establishment of the LACC. 10 December 1994 Official ceremony to present Nobel Peace Prize to Yizhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Yasir Arafat. 28 September 1995 — Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Oslo II. 31 October 1995 Beilin-

ber 1998 Wye River Agreement signed by Arafat and Netanyahu. 14 December 1998 The Palestinian National Council convenes in the presence of President Clinton to reaffirm the annulling of clauses of the Palestinian Charter which denied Israel’s right to exist. 7 February 1999 King Hussein of Jordan dies. A

12/9/2014, SPi xxiv Chronology 15 December 1999 President Clinton hosts summit meeting with Israel’s Prime Minister