Epstein Secrets

P ("Boies Schiller") to comply with a grand jury subpoena. The application is granted. I. Background A. The Protective Order In September 2015, Virginia L. Giuffre commenced a civil suit against Ghislaine Maxwell, alleging that Maxwell had defamed Giuffre by stating that Giuffre was not the victim of sex crime

A. The Protective Order In September 2015, Virginia L. Giuffre commenced a civil suit against Ghislaine Maxwell, alleging that Maxwell had defamed Giuffre by stating that Giuffre was not the victim of sex crimes perpetrated by, among others, Maxwell and Jeffrey Epstein ("Epstein"). (15-cv- 7433, Dkt. N

und A. The Protective Order In September 2015, Virginia L. Giuffre commenced a civil suit against Ghislai

eason for the Government to carry the firm's water—the moreso because Judge Sweet ruled some months before he died that the intervenors' appeals in Giuffie meant the lawsuit had not "concluded," and so had postponed the day when that contractual obligation kicked in. (15-cv-7433, Dkt. No. 967 at 6.)3 3

Protective Order. Permissive intervention is the appropriate procedural device when any non-party seeks to modify a protective order. AT&T Corp. v. Sprint Corp., 407 F.3d 560, 562 (2d Cir. 2005) ("We have stated that permissive intervention is the proper method for a nonparty to seek a modification of a pro

ere it would have been possible to have sex with Jane Doe #3."). In media statements, Dershowitz has repeatedl

n such intervention is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Stone' First Union Corp.. 371 F.3d 1305, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004); see also AT&T Cap. ' Sprint Corp., 407 F.3d 560, 561-62 (2nd Cir. 2005) ("[a] denial of permissive intervention has virtually never been reversed" because of the considerable discret

Entered on FLSD Docket 12/30/2014 Page 10 of 13 Jane Doe #3's and Jane Doe #4's participation is also directl

such intervention is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Stone'. First Union Corp.. 371 F.3d 1305, 1309 (1Ith Cir. 2004); see also AT&T Corp. '. Sprint Corp., 407 F.3d 560, 561-62 (2nd Cir. 2005) ("[a] denial of permissive intervention has virtually never been reversed" because of the considerable discret