Epstein Secrets

elfish herd. J.Theoret. Biol. 31.295-311. Harms. W.. 2001. Cooperative boundary populations: the evol

in which having a different behavior than one's partner produces a higher payoff. Doves cooperate by sharing resources but retreat when challenged. Hawks do not cooperate. They are ready to fight to avoid leaving an interaction empty-handed. A Hawk gets the entire resource when facing a Dove but suff

w). Thus, hi above are all rational functions of W. Therefore, from (4.89) we conclude that vn must

14 6.2 Mixed games with 2 strategies 119 6.3 Mixed games with two pure strategies 122 6.3.1 A resealed payoff matrix 125 6.3.2 Example: Hawks and Doves 126 6.4 A mixed 3-game: Cooperators, Defectors, Loners 130 6.5 Mixed games with n pure strategies 135 6.6 Conclusion 136 B

eton Univ. Press. [82] May RM, 2006. Network structure and the biology of populations. Trends. Ecol. Evol., 21, 394-399. [83] May, R.M., Leonard, W., 1975. Nonlinear aspects of competition between three species. SIAM J. Appl. Math. 29, 243-252. [84] May, R. M. and Nowak, M. A., 1995. Coinfection

. 0, the mixed phase extends to the quarter-plane a > 0, > 0. For large mutation ratesµ —• co, however, the mixed phase disappears. 6.3.2 Example: Hawks and Doves As an example, we consider the Hawk-Dove game (Maynard-Smith 1982, Houston Mcishunara 1988, Houston Sc McNamara 1991, IvIesterton-Gibbons

rom the writings and presentations by Dr. Stephen W. Purges. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Public

as freezing and feigning death. For example, a mouse freezes when it senses a predator nearby, becoming "as still as a mouse" to avoid detection. Hawks have extremely good eyesight and can pick up the slightest movement, even those of a mouse's normal breathing. If a hawk is cir- cling in a field ov