Epstein Secrets

on from disclosure to the plaintiffs. See, e.g., Ross v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596, 599 (6th Cir. 2

ich this case does not. Second, Mohawk was concerned with an interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), not with the Perlman exception to the final judgment rule; indeed, it did not so much as mention Perlman. Those two distinctio

no privilege of nondisclosure under state law"); Ross v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596,599 (6th Cir. 20

diately appealable. Id. Five notable exceptions to this rule exist: the Perlman doctrine; the collateral-order doctrine, Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S. Ct. 1221 (1949); a certification provided by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); a petition for a writ of mandamus; or an appeal of a

24 F.2d 158 (11th Cir. 1955) 55 *Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918) passim Reichenbach v. Smith, 528 F.2d 1072 (11th Cir. 1976) 32 Ross v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 2007) 54 *Santobello v. United States, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) 15, 16,31 S.E.C. v. CMKM Diamonds, Inc.

) 33 Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977) 31 Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9 (1992) 46 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) 47 Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 (1995) 21 Fol

privilege of nondisclosure un- der state law"); Ross I. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596, 599 (6th Cir.20

ks. EFTA00209814 Page 10 749 F.3d 999, 24 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1270 (Cite as: 749 F.3d 999) lateral-order doctrine, Cohen I. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); a certification provided by statute, 28 U.S.C. 1292(b); a petition for a writ of mandamus; or a

ion from disclosure to the plaintiffs. See, e.g., Ross v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596, 599 (6th Cir.

ich this case does not. Second, Mohawk was concerned with an interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), not with the Perlman exception to the final judgment rule; indeed, it did not so much as mention Perlman. Those two distincti

on from disclosure to the plaintiffs. See, e.g., Ross v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596, 599 (6th Cir. 2

ich this case does not. Second, Mohawk was concerned with an interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), not with the Perlman exception to the final judgment rule; indeed, it did not so much as mention Perlman. Those two distinctio

ion from disclosure to the plaintiffs. See, e.g., Ross v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596, 599 (6th Cir.

ich this case does not. Second, Mohawk was concerned with an interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), not with the Perlman exception to the final judgment rule; indeed, it did not so much as mention Perlman. Those two distincti