Epstein Secrets

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

t, "[t]he contention that there is some inherent prejudice in joining perjury and related counts with substantive charges has been widely rejected." Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791. And courts routinely hold that there is no prejudice where the evidence in support of the two counts is "interconnected." Blakney

r o f "underlying substantive crimes with perjury counts" is appropriate "where, as here, the false declarations concern the substantive offenses." Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791; see also United States v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1992) (same). In Ruiz, the defendant was a New York state senator who founde

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

t, "[t]he contention that there is some inherent prejudice in joining perjury and related counts with substantive charges has been widely rejected." Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791. And courts routinely hold that there is no prejudice where the evidence in support of the two counts is "interconnected." Blakney

er of "underlying substantive crimes with perjury counts" is appropriate "where, as here, the false declarations concern the substantive offenses." Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791; see also United States v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1992) (same). In Ruiz, the defendant was a New York state senator who founde

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

t, "[t]he contention that there is some inherent prejudice in joining perjury and related counts with substantive charges has been widely rejected." Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791. And courts routinely hold that there is no prejudice where the evidence in support of the two counts is "interconnected." Blakney

er of "underlying substantive crimes with perjury counts" is appropriate "where, as here, the false declarations concern the substantive offenses." Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791; see also United States v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1992) (same). In Ruiz, the defendant was a New York state senator who founde

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

t, "[t]he contention that there is some inherent prejudice in joining perjury and related counts with substantive charges has been widely rejected." Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791. And courts routinely hold that there is no prejudice where the evidence in support of the two counts is "interconnected." Blakney

er of "underlying substantive crimes with perjury counts" is appropriate "where, as here, the false declarations concern the substantive offenses." Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791; see also United States v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1992) (same). In 142 EFTA00095234 Ruiz, the defendant was a New York stat

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Bitrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

t, "[t]he contention that there is some inherent prejudice in joining perjury and related counts with substantive charges has been widely rejected." Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791. And courts routinely hold that there is no prejudice where the evidence in support of the two counts is "interconnected." Blakney

er of "underlying substantive crimes with perjury counts" is appropriate "where, as here, the false declarations concern the substantive offenses." Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791; see also United States v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1992) (same). In Ruiz, the defendant was a New York state senator who founde