Epstein Secrets

ing, 560 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1977) 64 United States v. Kozel, No. 19 Cr. 460 (KMW), 2020 WL 4751498 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2020) 236 United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751 (2d Cir. 1994) 183, 221, 222 United States v. Lanam, 369 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2004) 254 United States v. Lahey, 967 F. Supp. 2d 698

agrees that it will not institute any criminal charges against any potential co-conspirators of Epstein, including but not limited to Sarah Kellen, Adriana Ross, Lesley Groff, or Nadia Marcinkova. NPA at 5; Def. Mot. I at 20-21. Aside from the reference to "United States" which, as noted above, is insuffic

07 Cr. 1198 (CM), 2009 WL 176721 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2009) 269 United States v. Santiago, 987 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 75 United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2012) 179, 180 United States v. Saftar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 27 United States v. Savage, 970 F.3d 217

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

w being questioned in his role as trustee." 782 F.2d at 376. "[F]undamental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Farmer, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundament

ing, 560 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1977) 64 United States v. Kozel, No. 19 Cr. 460 (KMW), 2020 WL 4751498 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2020) 236 United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751 (2d Cir. 1994) 183, 221, 222 United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2004) 254 United States v. Lahey, 967 F. Supp. 2d 698

agrees that it will not institute any criminal charges against any potential co-conspirators of Epstein, including but not limited to Sarah Kellen, Adriana Ross, Lesley Groff, or Nadia Marcinkova. NPA at 5; Def. Mot. 1 at 20-21. Aside from the reference to "United States" which, as noted above, is insuffic

07 Cr. 1198 (CM), 2009 WL 176721 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2009) 269 United States v. Santiago, 987 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 75 United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2012) 179, 180 United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 27 United States v. Savage, 970 F.3d 217 (

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

w being questioned in his role as trustee." 782 F.2d at 376. "[F]undamental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundament

ing, 560 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1977) 64 United States v. Kozel, No. 19 Cr. 460 (KMW), 2020 WL 4751498 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2020) 236 United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751 (2d Cir. 1994) 183, 221, 222 United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2004) 254 United States v. Lahey, 967 F. Supp. 2d 698

agrees that it will not institute any criminal charges against any potential co-conspirators of Epstein, including but not limited to Sarah Kellen, Adriana Ross, Lesley Groff, or Nadia Marcinkova. NPA at 5; Def. Mot. 1 at 20-21. Aside from the reference to "United States" which, as noted above, is insuffic

07 Cr. 1198 (CM), 2009 WL 176721 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2009) 269 United States v. Santiago, 987 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 75 United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2012) 179, 180 United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 27 United States v. Savage, 970 F.3d 217 (

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

w being questioned in his role as trustee." 782 F.2d at 376. "[F]undamental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundament

v. King, 560 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1977) 44 United States v. Kozel, 19 Cr. 460 (KMW), 2020 WL 4751498 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2020) 155 United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751 (2d Cir. 1994) 122, 148 United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2004) 166 United States v. Lahey, 967 F. Supp. 2d 698 (S.D

agrees that it will not institute any criminal charges against any potential co-conspirators of Epstein, including but not limited to Sarah Kellen, Adriana Ross, Lesley Groff, or Nadia Marcinkova. NPA at 5; Def. Mot. 1 at 20-21. Aside from the reference to "United States" which, as noted above, is insuffic

07 Cr. 1198 (CM), 2009 WL 176721 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2009) 177 United States v. Santiago, 987 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 52 United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2012) 120, 121 United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 22 United States v. Savage, 970 F.3d 217 (

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

ow being questioned in his role as trustee." 782 F.2d at 376. "[F]undamental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamen

ing, 560 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1977) 64 United States v. Kozel, No. 19 Cr. 460 (KMW), 2020 WL 4751498 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2020) 236 United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751 (2d Cir. 1994) 183, 221, 222 United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2004) 254 United States v. Lahey, 967 F. Supp. 2d 69

07 Cr. 1198 (CM), 2009 WL 176721 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2009) 269 United States v. Santiago, 987 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 75 United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2012) 179, 180 United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 27 United States v. Savage, 970 F.3d 217