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truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury
axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o
age twenty-five, applied to past conduct. See United States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682, 684-85 (8th Cir. 2005). The Second Circuit has observed that the Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-26, 105 Stat. 123, illustrates language that requires a statute's application to past conduct. See Enter. Mortg. Acceptance C
truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury
axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o
age twenty-five, applied to past conduct. See United States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682, 684-85 (8th Cir. 2005). The Second Circuit has observed that the Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-26, 105 Stat. 123, illustrates language that requires a statute's application to past conduct. See Enter. Mortg. Acceptance C
truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury
axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o
age twenty-five, applied to past conduct. See United States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682, 684-85 (8th Cir. 2005). The Second Circuit has observed that the Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-26, 105 Stat. 123, illustrates language that requires a statute's application to past conduct. See Enter. Mortg. Acceptance C
truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury
axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o
age twenty-five, applied to past conduct. See United States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682, 684-85 (8th Cir. 2005). The Second Circuit has observed that the Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-26, 105 Stat. 123, illustrates language that requires a statute's application to past conduct. See Enter. Mortg. Acceptance C
truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury
axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o
age twenty-five, applied to past conduct. See United States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682, 684-85 (8th Cir. 2005). The Second Circuit has observed that the Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-26, 105 Stat. 123, illustrates language that requires a statute's application to past conduct. See Enter. Mortg. Acceptance C
truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury
axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o
age twenty-five, applied to past conduct. See United States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682, 684-85 (8th Cir. 2005). The Second Circuit has observed that the Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-26, 105 Stat. 123, illustrates language that requires a statute's application to past conduct. See Enter. Mortg. Acceptance C
truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury
axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o
age twenty-five, applied to past conduct. See United States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682, 684-85 (8th Cir. 2005). The Second Circuit has observed that the Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-26, 105 Stat. 123, illustrates language that requires a statute's application to past conduct. See Enter. Mortg. Acceptance C
truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury
axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o
age twenty-five, applied to past conduct. See United States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682, 684-85 (8th Cir. 2005). The Second Circuit has observed that the Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-26, 105 Stat. 123, illustrates language that requires a statute's application to past conduct. See Enter. Mortg. Acceptance C
truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury
axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o
age twenty-five, applied to past conduct. See United States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682, 684-85 (8th Cir. 2005). The Second Circuit has observed that the Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-26, 105 Stat. 123, illustrates language that requires a statute's application to past conduct. See Enter. Mortg. Acceptance C
truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury
axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o
age twenty-five, applied to past conduct. See United States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682, 684-85 (8th Cir. 2005). The Second Circuit has observed that the Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-26, 105 Stat. 123, illustrates language that requires a statute's application to past conduct. See Enter. Mortg. Acceptance C
Entities connected to both Adriana Ross and the Higher Education Technical Amendments of

Jeffrey Epstein
PERSON
Ghislaine Maxwell
PERSON
United States
LOCATIONthe Southern District
LOCATIONFBI
ORGANIZATION
Scarlett Johansson
PERSONEmmy Taylor
PERSON
Supreme Court
ORGANIZATION
Alberto Gonzales
PERSONWerner
PERSON
Southern District of New York
ORGANIZATION
Eric Holder
PERSONCollins
PERSON
Reid Weingarten
PERSONThompson
PERSON
Hernandez
PERSON
Medina
PERSON
Dodge
ORGANIZATIONSampson
PERSONMarkiewicz
PERSON