Epstein Secrets

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

ecause double jeopardy is meant to protect a defendant from successivepunishments for the same offense, a multiplicitous count does not violate the Clause unless and until sentence is imposed. See Josephberg, 459 F.3d at 355 ("Where there has been no prior conviction or acquittal, the Double Jeopardy

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

cause double jeopardy is meant to protect a defendant from successive punishments for the same offense, a multiplicitous count does not violate the Clause unless and until sentence is imposed. See Josephberg, 459 F.3d at 355 ("Where there has been no prior conviction or acquittal, the Double Jeopardy

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

cause double jeopardy is meant to protect a defendant from successive punishments for the same offense, a multiplicitous count does not violate the Clause unless and until sentence is imposed. See Josephberg, 459 F.3d at 355 ("Where there has been no prior conviction or acquittal, the Double Jeopardy

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

cause double jeopardy is meant to protect a defendant from successive punishments for the same offense, a multiplicitous count does not violate the Clause unless and until sentence is imposed. See Josephberg, 459 F.3d at 355 ("Where there has been no prior conviction or acquittal, the Double Jeopardy

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Bitrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

cause double jeopardy is meant to protect a defendant from successive punishments for the same offense, a multiplicitous count does not violate the Clause unless and until sentence is imposed. See Josephberg, 459 F.3d at 355 ("Where there has been no prior conviction or acquittal, the Double Jeopardy

y Jane Doe #14. (126) On or about January 26, 2005, one of Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN's employees prepared a written telephone message for Defendant ADRIANA ROSS's review regarding a call received from Jane Doe #14 that read: "She is confirming for 5:30". 4, (127) On or about January 26, 2005, Defendant ADRI

m might commit in the future. In so doing, the Court stated: Appellee's argument assumes the exist- ence of a periphery of the Self—Incrimi- nation Clause which protects a person against incrimination not only against past or present transgressions but which supplies insulation for a career of crime