Epstein Secrets

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

legislature's authority to define an offense includes the power `to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its definition.'" Id. (quoting Lambert v. California , 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957)). The Tenth Circuit also agreed with the legislative history, finding that the statute "protects children from sexual ab

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

legislature's authority to define an offense includes the power `to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its definition.'" Id. (quoting Lambert v. California , 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957)). The Tenth Circuit also agreed with the legislative history, finding that the statute "protects children from sexual ab

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

legislature's authority to define an offense includes the power `to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its definition.'" Id. (quoting Lambert v. California , 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957)). The Tenth Circuit also agreed with the legislative history, finding that the statute "protects children from sexual ab

her sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are int

legislature's authority to define an offense includes the power `to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its definition."' Id. (quoting Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957)). The Tenth Circuit also agreed with the legislative history, finding that the statute "protects children from sexual abus