Epstein Secrets

her sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are int

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e., that he intended to commit the crime. I 1 th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowin

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing