Epstein Secrets

language of the plaintiff's complaint and construe Count I as a claim for common-law assault, that claim would also fail. As the court explained in Lay v. Kremer, 411 So. 2d 1347, 1349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), an assault is "an intentional, unlawful offer of corporal injury to another by force, or force unlawful

here are no allegations that Jane Doe was placed in any fear of imminent peril. See Gatto v. Pubblx Supermarket, Inc., 387 So. 2d 377, 379 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (holding that where there was no evidence to show that Gatto was placed in fear of imminent peril, there was no assault). In fact, the plaintiff do

language of the plaintiff's complaint and construe Count I as a claim for common-law assault, that claim would also fail. As the court explained in Lay v. Kremer, 411 So. 2d 1347, 1349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), an assault is "an intentional, unlawful offer of corporal injury to another by force, or force unlawful

here are no allegations that Jane Doe was placed in any fear of imminent peril. See Gatto v. Pubblx Supermarket, Inc., 387 So. 2d 377, 379 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (holding that where there was no evidence to show that Gatto was placed in fear of imminent peril, there was no assault). In fact, the plaintiff do

language of the plaintiff's complaint and construe Count I as a claim for common-law assault, that claim would also fail. As the court explained in Lay v. Kremer, 411 So. 2d 1347, 1349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), an assault is "an intentional, unlawful offer of corporal injury to another by force, or force unlawful

here are no allegations that Jane Doe was placed in any fear of imminent peril. See Gatto v. Pubblx Supermarket, Inc., 387 So. 2d 377, 379 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (holding that where there was no evidence to show that Gatto was placed in fear of imminent peril, there was no assault). In fact, the plaintiff do