Epstein Secrets

ial burden on the government to prove a grand jury subpoena is necessary and relevant." In re Impounded , 241 F.3d 308, 314 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting R. Enter , supra , 498 U.S. at 298-99). See also Blair v. United States , 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919) (a grand jury witness cannot refuse to respond to a subpoe

"Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 167 (quoting McNeil at 175). The Cobb Court noted that some other courts: have read into McNeil 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factually related' to a charge

ial burden on the government to prove a grand jury subpoena is necessary and relevant." In re Impounded , 241 F.3d 308, 314 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting R. Enter , supra , 498 U.S. at 298-99). See also Blair I United States , 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919) (a grand jury witness cannot refuse to respond to a subpoen

"Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 167 (quoting McNeil at 175). The Cobb Court noted that some other courts: have read into McNeil 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factually related' to a charge

if there is a reasonable possibility that the materials sought by the government will produce information relevant to the grand jury investigation. R. Enter., 498 U.S. at 300. Despite these broad powers, Epstein objects to the subpoenas that specifically call for and describe three computers, arguing th

e "Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 167 (quoting McNeil at 175). The Cobb Court noted that some -34- EFTA00179133 other courts: have read into McNeil's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are 'factually