Epstein Secrets

. 325, 337 (1985). Likewise, whether a subpoena is oppressive depends on the context. In re August, 1993 Regular Grand Jury , 854E Supp. 1392, 1401 (S.D. Ind. 1993). The context here is the wholesale removal of these computers just days before a court authorized a warrant for their seizure. The context of

"Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 167 (quoting McNeil at 175). The Cobb Court noted that some other courts: have read into McNeil 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factually related' to a charge

. 325, 337 (1985). Likewise, whether a subpoena is oppressive depends on the context. In re August, 1993 Regular Grand Jury , 854E Supp. 1392, 1401 (S.D. Ind. 1993). The context here is the wholesale removal of these computers just days before a court authorized a warrant for their seizure. The context of

"Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 167 (quoting McNeil at 175). The Cobb Court noted that some other courts: have read into McNeil 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factually related' to a charge

325, 337 (1985). Likewise, whether a subpoena is oppressive depends on the context. In re August, 1993 Regular Grand Jury, 854 F. Supp. 1392, 1401 (S.D. Ind. 1993). The context here is the wholesale removal of these computers just days before a court authorized a warrant for their seizure. The context of

e "Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 167 (quoting McNeil at 175). The Cobb Court noted that some -34- EFTA00179133 other courts: have read into McNeil's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are 'factually