Epstein Secrets

naged by MG. (Compl. 1112, 24; Epstein Decl. 118-10; Davison Aft 11 1, 102-18.) According to the plaintiffs, during the negotiations of this deal Davison represented to Epstein that he was "virtually assured of receiving an 18-20% return on [his] investment, with a possible return of as much as 80%"

ontacted Davison and other employees of Citibank, and requested Citibank's help in coordinating the replacement of the MG fund's manager. (Id 121; Schantz Decl. 1 5.) In May 2001, Davison informed the plaintiffs that, in order to remove MG as the fund manager, FTC would need sixty- six and two-thirds perc

According to the plaintiffs, during the negotiations of this deal Davison represented to Epstein that he was "virtually assured of receiving an 18-20% return on [hisj investment, with a possible return of as much as 30%" a

ntacted Davison and other employees of Citibank, and requested Citibank's help in coordinating the replacement of the AIG fund's manager. (Id. ¶ 21; Schantz Decl. ¶ 5.) In May 2001, Davison informed the plaintiffs that, in order to remove AIG as the fund manager, FTC would need sixty-six and two-thirds percen

plaintiffs seek rescission of the promissory note and punitive damages (Counts VI and VII). (Am. Compl. III 45-68.) In April 1999, Dayle Davison ["Davison"], Vice President of Citibank in New York and Epstein's private banker, and other Citibank employees telephoned Epstein while he was in the Virgin

tacted Davison and other employees of Citibank, and requested Citibank's help in coordinating the replacement of the AIG fund's manager. (Id. 1 21; Schantz Decl. 1 5.) In May 2001, Davison informed the plaintiffs that, in order to remove AIG as the fund manager, FTC would need sixty-six and two-thirds perce