Epstein Secrets

discovery of the correspondence between the U.S. and Epstein's attorneys during the plea negotiations. Epstein's attorneys intervened, arguing that Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 create a privilege for plea negotiations, barring release of the correspondence. They also argued that th

ge is rooted in the imperative for confidence and trust, the evidentiary benefit of the denial of the privilege, and any consensus among the states, Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-15 (1996)—but none of these considerations weighs in favor of recognizing a new privilege to prevent discovery of the plea negotiat

r discovery of the correspondence between the U.S. and Epstein’s attorneys during the plea negotiations. Epstein’s attorneys intervened, arguing that Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 create a privilege for plea negotiations, barring release of the correspondence. They also argued that the

ege is rooted in the imperative for confidence and trust, the evidentiary benefit of the denial of the privilege, and any consensus among the states, Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-15 (1996}—but none of these considerations weighs in favor of recognizing a new privilege to prevent discovery of the plea negotiatio

r discovery of the correspondence between the M. and Epstein's attorneys during the plea negotiations. Epstein's attorneys intervened, arguing that Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure I I create a privilege for plea negotiations, barring release of the correspondence. They also argued that t

lege is rooted in the imperative for confidence and trust, the evidentiary bit of the denial of the privilege, and any consensus among the states, Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 I. 10-15 (1996)—but none of these considerations weighs in favor of recognizing a new privilege to prevent discovery of the plea negotiations