Epstein Secrets

ated in any way with M, asserting instead that Epstein merely "had contacts at M." FAC ¶ 60. Such bare allegations are insufficient. Ashland Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 652 F.3d 333, 338 (2d Cir. 2011) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff could not have reasonably relied on defendant); Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Es

re relaxed pleading standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Igbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009). These two decisions set forth the basic requirements for pleading a claim. As explained and applied by the Second Circuit:

the ability "to have Plaintiff admitted to' For example, the Complaint fails to allege that Epstein was associated in any way wit Ashland Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 652 F.3d 333, 338 (2d Cir. 2011) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff could not have reasonably relied on defendant); Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Est

fendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief. Wood, 328 Fed.Appx. at 747 (quoting Igbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949). Here, at best, the Complaint merely parrots the statutory elements of a Section 1595 claim regarding fraud and coercion withou

bility "to have Plaintiff admitted to" . For example, the Complaint fails to allege that Epstein was associated in any way with . Ashland Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 652 F.3d 333, 338 (2d Cir. 2011) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff could not have reasonably relied on defendant); Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Est

fendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief. Wood, 328 Fed.Appx. at 747 (quoting Igbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949). Here, the Complaint merely parrots the statutory elements of a Section 1595 claim regarding fraud and coercion. As described i