Epstein Secrets

, but we decline to draw an arbitrary line. The victims' argument has an ipse dixit quality—that is, because our Court has never before applied the Penman doctrine outside of the grand jury context, we should not do so now. But we must ask instead whether applying the doctrine here makes sense. 11 E

7th Cir. 2010); see also In re Grand Jury, 705 F.3d at 145-46 & n.11 (rejecting that Mohawk narrowed Perlman "at least in the grand jury context"); Holt-Orstedl. City of Dickson, 641 F.3d 230, 239 (6th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that Perlman jurisdiction remains when a nonparty asserts a privilege); Krane, 625

, but we decline to draw an arbitrary line. The victims' argument has an ipse dixit quality—that is, because our Court has never before applied the Penman doctrine outside of the grand jury context, we should not do so now. But we must ask instead whether applying the doctrine here makes sense. 11 E

7th Cir. 2010); see also In re Grand Jury, 705 F.3d at 145-46 & n.11 (rejecting that Mohawk narrowed Perlman "at least in the grand jury context"); Holt-Orstedl. City of Dickson, 641 F.3d 230, 239 (6th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that Perlman jurisdiction remains when a nonparty asserts a privilege); Krane, 625

, but we decline to draw an arbitrary line. The victims' argument has an ipse dixit quality—that is, because our Court has never before applied the Penman doctrine outside of the grand jury context, we should not do so now. But we must ask instead whether applying the doctrine here makes sense. 11 E

7th Cir. 2010); see also In re Grand Jury, 705 F.3d at 145-46 & n.11 (rejecting that Mohawk narrowed Perlman "at least in the grand jury context"); Holt-Orstedl. City of Dickson, 641 F.3d 230, 239 (6th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that Perlman jurisdiction remains when a nonparty asserts a privilege); Krane, 625