Epstein Secrets

ralized Control Center. Access into the SHU was further controlled by a second locked door (Main Interior Entry Door), to which a limited number of Correctional Officers (CO) had keys while on duty. Secondary access to the SHU was controlled by a locked door. That door was opened remotely by a staff member in the centra

said "ghost counting" was not permitted, and stressed the importance of an accurate physical count of inmates. 3. The 12 a.m., 3 a.m., and 5 a.m. SHU Counts on August 10 The Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant told the OIG that she supervised the August 10 12 a.m. institutional count from the Control Ce

alized Control Center. Access into the SHU was further controlled by a second locked door (Main Interior Entry Door), to which a limited number of Correctional Officers (CO) had keys while on duty. Secondary access to the SHU was controlled by a locked door. That door was opened remotely by a staff member in the centr

o said “ghost counting” was not permitted, and stressed the importance of an accurate physical count of inmates. 3. The 12 a.m., 3 a.m., and 5 a.m. SHU Counts on August 10 The Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant told the OIG that she supervised the August 10 12 a.m. institutional count from the Control Ce

ralized Control Center. Access into the SHU was further controlled by a second locked door (Main Interior Entry Door), to which a limited number of Correctional Officers (CO) had keys while on duty. Secondary access to the SHU was controlled by a locked door. That door was opened remotely by a staff member in the centra

said "ghost counting" was not permitted, and stressed the importance of an accurate physical count of inmates. 3. The 12 a.m., 3 a.m., and 5 a.m. SHU Counts on August 10 The Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant told the OIG that she supervised the August 10 12 a.m. institutional count from the Control Ce