Epstein Secrets

OIG's investigation and review revealed significant gaps in the supervision of MCC New York staff assigned to the SHU. Although BOP policy requires MCC New York Lieutenants to conduct at least one round in the SHU during each shift, what was required of a Lieutenant during the round is not specified. During their inter

safety as well as the safety of staff and other inmates. Access to the SHU was controlled by multiple locked doors. The primary entrance to the SHU (Main Exterior Entry Door) was opened remotely by a staff member in MCC New York's centralized Control Center. Additionally, there was a second locked door at the

Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant said he was aware that Epstein was required to have a cellmate due to a mass email that was sent to all of the MCC New York Lieutenants. According to the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant, everyone who regularly worked in the SHU should have known that Epstein was required to have

safety as well as the safety of staff and other inmates. Access to the SHU was controlled by multiple locked doors. The primary entrance to the SHU (Main Exterior Entry Door) was opened remotely by a staff member in MCC New York's centralized Control Center. Additionally, there was a second locked door at the

OIG’s investigation and review revealed significant gaps in the supervision of MCC New York staff assigned to the SHU. Although BOP policy requires MCC New York Lieutenants to conduct at least one round in the SHU during each shift, what was required of a Lieutenant during the round is not specified. During their inte

fety as well as the safety of staff and other inmates. Access to the SHU was controlled by multiple locked doors. The primary entrance to the SHU (Main Exterior Entry Door) was opened remotely by a staff member in MCC New York’s centralized Control Center. Additionally, there was a second locked door at th

OIG's investigation and review revealed significant gaps in the supervision of MCC New York staff assigned to the SHU. Although BOP policy requires MCC New York Lieutenants to conduct at least one round in the SHU during each shift, what was required of a Lieutenant during the round is not specified. During their inter

safety as well as the safety of staff and other inmates. Access to the SHU was controlled by multiple locked doors. The primary entrance to the SHU (Main Exterior Entry Door) was opened remotely by a staff member in MCC New York's centralized Control Center. Additionally, there was a second locked door at the