Epstein Secrets

tates v. Johns, 15 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that an earlier version of § 3509(k) applied to conduct predating its enactment in 1990)). The Eighth Circuit's reasoning—which addressed earlier versions of the statute—applies with equal, if not greater, 28 EFTA00077660 force to the 2003 amendment, which

Judge McMahon found that because Maxwell's reliance on the protective order in that case as a "shield [. . .] from the court-ordered disclosure of Confidential Materials pursuant to a grand jury subpoena was unreasonable, the Court may exercise its discretion to grant the Government's application." (Id. at 22). The C

tates v. Johns, 15 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that an earlier version of § 3509(k) applied to conduct predating its enactment in 1990)). The Eighth Circuit's reasoning—which addressed earlier versions of the statute—applies with equal, if not greater, 28 EFTA00039475 force to the 2003 amendment, which

Judge McMahon found that because Maxwell's reliance on the protective order in that case as a "shield [. . .] from the court-ordered disclosure of Confidential Materials pursuant to a grand jury subpoena was unreasonable, the Court may exercise its discretion to grant the Government's application." (Id. at 22). The C

tates v. Johns, 15 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that an earlier version of § 3509(k) applied to conduct predating its enactment in 1990)). The Eighth Circuit's reasoning— which addressed earlier versions of the statute—applies with equal, if not greater, force to the 2003 amendment, which established an eve

Judge McMahon found that because Maxwell's relianTI on the protective order in that case as a "shield [. . .] from the court-ordered disclosure of Confidential Materials pursuant to a grand jury subpoena was unreasonable, the Court may exercise its discretion to grant the Government's application." (Id. at 22). The C

F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that an earlier version 28 EFTA00103053 of § 3509(k) applied to conduct predating its enactment in 1990)). The Eighth Circuit's reasoning—which addressed earlier versions of the statute—applies with equal, if not greater, force to the 2003 amendment, which established an eve

Judge McMahon found that because Maxwell's reliance on the protective order in that case as a "shield [. . .] from the court-ordered disclosure of Confidential Materials pursuant to a grand jury subpoena was unreasonable, the Court may exercise its discretion to grant the Government's application." (Id. at 22). The C