Epstein Secrets

th Amendment rights are personal rights ... [that] may not be vicariously asserted."' United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights "are violated only when the challenged conduct invade

ent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130, n.1; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980). Under the third party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment "does not prohi

wyer is called "on a significant issue other than on behalf of the client, and it is apparent that the testimony may be prejudicial to the client." N.Y. R.P.C. 3.7(b); see generally Murray v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 173, 177-80 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing the advocate-witness rule). 149 EFTA00077781 VII.

th Amendment rights are personal rights ... [that] may not be vicariously asserted."' United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights "are violated only when the challenged conduct invade

ent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130, n.1; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980). Under the third party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment "does not prohi

wyer is called "on a significant issue other than on behalf of the client, and it is apparent that the testimony may be prejudicial to the client." N.Y. R.P.C. 3.7(b); see generally Murray v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 173, 177-80 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing the advocate-witness rule). 149 EFTA00039596 VII.

th Amendment rights are personal rights ... [that] may not be vicariously asserted."' United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights "are violated only when the challenged conduct invade

ent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130, n.1; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980). Under the third party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment "does not prohi

wyer is called "on a significant issue other than on behalf of the client, and it is apparent that the testimony may be prejudicial to the client." N.Y. R.P.C. 3.7(b); see generally Murray v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 173, 177-80 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing the advocate-witness rule). 149 EFTA00103174 VII.

ent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130, n.1; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980). Under the third party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment "does not prohi

wyer is called "on a significant issue other than on behalf of the client, and it is apparent that the testimony may be prejudicial to the client." N.Y. R.P.C. 3.7(b); see generally Murray v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 173, 177-80 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing the advocate-witness rule). 149 EFTA00100116 VII.