Epstein Secrets

ssued a "subpoena for the production of documents as part of an ongoing investigation." (Id. at 25). In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martindell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

er the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptional circumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification of protective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initial

dment, or by a statutory grant of use immunity, and that a protective order therefore cannot be used to abridge a witness' fifth amendment rights." Andover Data Servs., 876 F.2d at 1083 (emphasis in original); see id. at 1084 ("Uncertainty about the ultimate outcome of a protective order will mean that no deponen

er the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptional circumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification of protective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initial

ssued a "subpoena for the production of documents as part of an ongoing investigation." (Id. at 25). In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martindell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

dment, or by a statutory grant of use immunity, and that a protective order therefore cannot be used to abridge a witness' fifth amendment rights." Andover Data Servs., 876 F.2d at 1083 (emphasis in original); see id. at 1084 ("Uncertainty about the ultimate outcome of a protective order will mean that no deponen

er the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptional circumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification of protective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N. Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initi

grand jury that had issued a alliena for the production of documents as parl'of an ongoing ation5). In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martindell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

dment, or by a statutory grant of use immunity, and that a protective order therefore cannot be used to abridge a witness' fifth amendment rights." Andover Data Servs., 876 F.2d at 1083 (emphasis in original); see id. at 1084 ("Uncertainty about the ultimate outcome of a protective order will mean that no deponen

er the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptional circumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification of protective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initial

ssued a "subpoena for the production of documents as part of an ongoing investigation." (Id. at 25). In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martindell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

dment, or by a statutory grant of use immunity, and that a protective order therefore cannot be used to abridge a witness' fifth amendment rights." Andover Data Servs., 876 F.2d at 1083 (emphasis in original); see id. at 1084 ("Uncertainty about the ultimate outcome of a protective order will mean that no deponen

al by motion to quash or modify the subpoena ... or to seek permissive intervention in the private action.") (internal quotations omitted); but see Palmieri v. State of N Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (considering appeal where the New York State Attorney General, rather than the subject of the subpoena, w

er is "improvidently granted" where the presiding judge "reasonably should have recognized that [it] would facilitate or further criminal activity." Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 865-66. But there is absolutely no evidence that the district court harbored any such realization; indeed, at the time Judge Sweet ent

le 26(c) protective order may be overturned or modified [only] based on a finding of improvidence, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need." Andover Data Servs., a Div. of Players Computer, Inc. v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 876 F.2d 1080,1083 (2d Cir. 1989). Moreover, the Second Circuit has held that M

l by motion to quash or modify the subpoena . .. or to seek permissive intervention in the private action.") (internal quotations omitted); but see Palmieri v. State of N. Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (considering appeal where the New York State Attorney General, rather than the subject of the s

of a protective order will mean that no deponent may always effectively rely on a protective order to secure his right against self-incrimination." Andover Data Servs., 876 F.2d at 1084 (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1478 (4th Cir. 1988)). Because Maxwell's reliance on the Protective Order to