Epstein Secrets

"the rule that `an indictment need do little more than to track the language of the statute charged,'" her motion should be denied. United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims

d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and only rarely is alleged surplusage stricken from an indictment." 159 EFTA00077791 Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 724 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 547, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)). In setting f

ssued a "subpoena for the production of documents as part of an ongoing investigation." (Id. at 25). In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martindell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

er the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptional circumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification of protective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initial

"the rule that `an indictment need do little more than to track the language of the statute charged,'" her motion should be denied. United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims

d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and only rarely is alleged surplusage stricken from an indictment." 159 EFTA00039606 Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 724 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 547, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)). In setting f

er the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptional circumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification of protective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initial

ssued a "subpoena for the production of documents as part of an ongoing investigation." (Id. at 25). In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martindell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

"the rule that `an indictment need do little more than to track the language of the statute charged,' her motion should be denied. United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). 152 EFTA00095244 First, the use of pseudonyms to ref

the relevance of these allegations, the defendant has not satisfied the "exacting" standard required to justify striking portions of an Indictment. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 724 (quoting Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d at 610). Accordingly, the motion should be denied, or, 57 The defense motion takes issue wi

er the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptional circumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification of protective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N. Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initi

grand jury that had issued a alliena for the production of documents as parl'of an ongoing ation5). In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martindell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

"the rule that `an indictment need do little more than to track the language of the statute charged,'" her motion should be denied. United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims

d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and only rarely is alleged surplusage stricken from an indictment." 159 EFTA00103184 Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 724 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 547, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)). In setting f

er the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptional circumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification of protective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initial

ssued a "subpoena for the production of documents as part of an ongoing investigation." (Id. at 25). In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martindell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

the relevance of these allegations, the defendant has not satisfied the "exacting" standard required to justify striking portions of an Indictment. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 724 (quoting Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d at 610). Accordingly, the motion should be denied, or, at the very least, deferred until "p

3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and only rarely is alleged surplusage stricken from an indictment" 159 EFTA00100126 Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 724 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 547, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)). In setting f

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initial

Parties' reliance."). 79 EFTA00100046 cau PPIal (Id. washy a granrad issulaubeaurnalMI an In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martind ell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

her the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptionalcircumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification o fprotective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc