Epstein Secrets

that may, on their own, be untimely can nevertheless serve as direct evidence of the existence of a charged conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Benussi, 216 F. Supp. 2d 299, 301-07, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (admitting evidence of otherwise untimely acts during conspiracy trial); cf. United States v. Mar

ictim-3's experiences in the Indictment "may not be stricken" "regardless of how prejudicial the language is .. ." Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1013 (quoting DePahna, 461 F. Supp. at 797). Finally, even if Minor Victim-3's experiences did not constitute direct evidence of the crimes charged—which they do—this s

that may, on their own, be untimely can nevertheless serve as direct evidence of the existence of a charged conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Benussi, 216 F. Supp. 2d 299, 301-07, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (admitting evidence of otherwise untimely acts during conspiracy trial); cf. United States v. Mar

ictim-3's experiences in the Indictment "may not be stricken" "regardless of how prejudicial the language is .. ." Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1013 (quoting DePahna, 461 F. Supp. at 797). Finally, even if Minor Victim-3's experiences did not constitute direct evidence of the crimes charged—which they do—this s

182 United States v. Bellomo, 263 F. Supp. 2d 561 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) 176 United States v. Ben Zvi, 242 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2001) 31 United States v. Benussi, 216 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 163, 164 United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 176 United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d

17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 114 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 53 United States v. DePahna, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 159, 164 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 112 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

that may, on their own, be untimely can nevertheless serve as direct evidence of the existence of a charged conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Benussi, 216 F. Supp. 2d 299, 301-07, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (admitting evidence of otherwise untimely acts during conspiracy trial); cl United States v. Marc

ant to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken." Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePahna, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o