Epstein Secrets

"case" as "a question contested before a court of justice"). This general understanding is equally applicable to criminal proceedings. In Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2005), the Supreme Court held that a criminal "case" — as distinct from an investigation — "at the very least requires the initiation

RA, when the purchasers were required to pay a two percent mortgage origination fee, instead of the one percent fee which Coast Bank of Florida and American Mortgage Link, the mortgage origination firm, had agreed would be paid by a purchaser. The additional one percent was pocketed by defendant Phillip Coon, an Exec

"case" as "a question contested before a court of justice"). This general understanding is equally applicable to criminal proceedings. In Chavez v. Martinez , 538 U.S. 760 (2005), the Supreme Court held that a criminal "case" — as distinct from an investigation — "at the very least requires the initiati

e additional one percent was pocketed by defendant Phillip Coon, an Executive Vice-President of Coast Bank, and defendant John Miller, president of American Mortgage Link. Coon and Miller were charged in a one-count Information on October 15, 2008, with conspiracy to deprive the bank of honest services in violation o

"case" as "a question contested before a court of justice"). This general understanding is equally applicable to criminal proceedings. In Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2005), the Supreme Court held that a criminal "case" — as distinct from an investigation — "at the very least requires the initiation

RA, when the purchasers were required to pay a two percent mortgage origination fee, instead of the one percent fee which Coast Bank of Florida and American Mortgage Link, the mortgage origination firm, had agreed would be paid by a purchaser. The additional one percent was pocketed by defendant Phillip Coon, an Exec

rc "merely a statement of assertion or concession made for some independent purpose," and may be controverted or explained by the party who made it. Martinez I Bally's Louisiana, Inc., 244 F.3d 474, 476-77 (51° Cir. 2001), citing McNamara v. Miller, 269 F.2d 511, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1959). In contrast, a judi

RA, when the purchasers were required to pay a two percent mortgage origination fee, instead of the one percent fee which Coast Bank of Florida and American Mortgage Link, the mortgage origination firm, had agreed would be paid by a purchaser. The additional one percent was pocketed by defendant Phillip Coon, an Exec

re "merely a statement of assertion or concession made for some independent purpose," and may be controverted or explained by the party who made it. Martinez v. Bally's Louisiana, Inc., 244 F.3d 474, 476-77 (V' Cir. 2001), citing McNamara v. Miller, 269 F.2d 511, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1959). In contrast, a judi

RA, when the purchasers were required to pay a two percent mortgage origination fee, instead of the one percent fee which Coast Bank of Florida and American Mortgage Link, the mortgage origination firm, had agreed would be paid by a purchaser. The additional one percent was pocketed by defendant Phillip Coon, an Exec

re "merely a statement of assertion or concession made for some independent purpose," and may be controverted or explained by the party who made it. Martinez I. Bally's Louisiana, Inc., 244 F.3d 474, 476-77 (V' Cir. 2001), citing McNamara'. Miller, 269 F.2d 511, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1959). In contrast, a judic

RA, when the purchasers were required to pay a two percent mortgage origination fee, instead of the one percent fee which Coast Bank of Florida and American Mortgage Link, the mortgage origination firm, had agreed would be paid by a purchaser. The additional one percent was pocketed by defendant Phillip Coon, an Exec