Epstein Secrets

Issues, Report Number 23-065 (Limited-Scope Review). Please report any additional updates on the BOP's response to this recommendation to the OIG's Evaluation and Inspections Division in connection with the Limited- Scope Review. The OIG will close this recommendation when it closes Recommendation 5 from the Limited-Scope Review.

ter), for newly hired Correctional Officers who onboard between March 26, 2023, through September 24, 2023. That incentive was recently extended to Correctional Officers who enter on duty with an effective date no later than December 17, 2023. Further, in July 2023, the Director approved a Bureau-wide retention ince

Issues, Report Number 23-065 (Limited-Scope Review). Please report any additional updates on the BOP's response to this recommendation to the OIG's Evaluation and Inspections Division in connection with the Limited- Scope Review. The OIG will close this recommendation when it closes Recommendation 5 from the Limited-Scope Review.

ter), for newly hired Correctional Officers who onboard between March 26, 2023, through September 24, 2023. That incentive was recently extended to Correctional Officers who enter on duty with an effective date no later than December 17, 2023. Further, in July 2023, the Director approved a Bureau-wide retention ince

Inspections Division Report 16-02 (March 2016); U.S. DOJ OIG, Review of the Impact of an Aging Inmate Population on the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Evaluation and Inspections Division Report 15-05 (May 2015). Additionally, multiple remote inspections the OIG conducted as part of its pandemic response oversight work revealed that

y, there was a second locked door at the main entrance (Main Interior Entry Door), which could be opened only with a key held by a limited number of Correctional Officers (CO) while on duty.55 Within the SHU, the entrance to each tier could be accessed only via a single locked door at the top or bottom of the stairc

and Inspections Division Report 16-02 (March 2016); U.S. DOJ OIG, Review oftheimport of an Aging Inmate Population on the Federal Bureau of Pr/cons Evaluation and Inspections Division Report 15-05 (May 2015). Additionally, multiple remote inspections the OIG conducted as part of its pandemic response oversight work revealed that s

y, there was a second locked door at the main entrance (Main Interior Entry Door), which could be opened only with a key held by a limited number of Correctional Officers (CO) while on duty.0 Within the SHU, the entrance to each tier could be accessed only via a single locked door at the top or bottom of the staircas