Epstein Secrets

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

t that the information is held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user's claim to Fourth Amendment protection." Id. at 2217; see also Zietzke v. United States, 426 F. Supp. 3d 758, 768 (W.D. Wash. 2019) ("The Court . . . will extend Carpenter to new circumstances only if they directly implicate the privacy

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

t that the information is held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user's claim to Fourth Amendment protection." Id. at 2217; see also Zietzke v. United States, 426 F. Supp. 3d 758, 768 (W.D. Wash. 2019) ("The Court . . . will extend Carpenter to new circumstances only if they directly implicate the privacy

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are am

t that the information is held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user's claim to Fourth Amendment protection." Id. at 2217; see also Zietzke v. United States, 426 F. Supp. 3d 758, 768 (W.D. Wash. 2019) ("The Court ... will extend Carpenter to new circumstances only if they directly implicate the privacy

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sanvari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

t that the information is held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user's claim to Fourth Amendment protection." Id. at 2217; see also Zietzke v. United States, 426 F. Supp. 3d 758, 768 (W.D. Wash. 2019) ("The Court . . . will extend Carpenter to new circumstances only if they directly implicate the privacy