Epstein Secrets

. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00077619 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) United States v. Fennell, 166, 169 179, 180 8, 20, 27 4

Supp. 2d 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 268 United States v. Monserrate, No. 10 Cr. 965 (CM), 2011 WL 3480957 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2011) 267 United States v. Montoya-Eschevarria, 892 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 118 United States v. Moore, 968 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1992) 125 United States v. Morgan, 113 F.3d 1230, 1997 WL

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

nding is met only by sworn evidence, in the form of affidavit or testimony, from the defendant or someone with personal knowledge." United States v. Montoya-Eschevarria, 892 F. Supp. 104, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Ulbricht, No. 14 Cr. 68 (KBF), 2014 WL 5090039, at *6 (S.D.N.

. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00039434 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) United States v. Fennell, 166, 169 179, 180 8, 20, 27 4

Supp. 2d 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 268 United States v. Monserrate, No. 10 Cr. 965 (CM), 2011 WL 3480957 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2011) 267 United States v. Montoya-Eschevarria, 892 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 118 United States v. Moore, 968 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1992) 125 United States v. Morgan, 113 F.3d 1230, 1997 WL

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

nding is met only by sworn evidence, in the form of affidavit or testimony, from the defendant or someone with personal knowledge." United States v. Montoya-Eschevarria, 892 F. Supp. 104, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Ulbricht, No. 14 Cr. 68 (KBF), 2014 WL 5090039, at *6 (S.D.N.

nited States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 54 xii EFTA00095079 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) 113, 114 United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) 120, 121 United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) 6, 18, 22 United States v. Fennell, 496 F. Supp

5 F. Supp. 2d 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 176 United States v. Monserrate, 10 Cr. 965 (CM), 2011 WL 3480957 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2011) 175 United States v. Montoya-Eschevarria, 892 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 83 United States v. Moore, 968 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1992) 88 United States v. Morgan, 113 F.3d 1230 (2d Cir. 19

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sanvari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

nding is met only by sworn evidence, in the form of affidavit or testimony, from the defendant or someone with personal knowledge." United States v. Montoya-Eschevarria, 892 F. Supp. 104, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Ulbricht, No. 14 Cr. 68 (KBF), 2014 WL 5090039, at *6 (S.D.N.